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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF THE CASE

This case arises from a failed golf course development project in Sandpoint, Idaho known
as the "Idaho Club" undertaken by Pend Oreille Bonner Development, LLC. ("POBD"). March
16, 2016 Trial Tr. p. 582, 1. 17 - p. 583, 1. 2. POBD took out several loans to finance the
development and subsequently defaulted on them, failed to pay mechanics and materialmen for
their services, and failed to pay Bonner County for real property taxes. At this juncture, the present
case involves a,suit by Valiant Idaho, LLC ("Valiant) to collect on certain promissory notes, to
foreclose the mortgages securing those notes, and to foreclosure a redemption deed obtained by
Valiant from Bonner County for some past due real property taxes it paid on some of the parcels.

B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

The record in this matter is voluminous. Given the number of parties involved in the
foreclosure proceedings, many of the pleadings are not relevant to this appeal. This course of
proceedings is abbreviated to address those aspects which relate to VP Incorporated's present
appeal.
This suit commenced on October 13, 2009 when Genesis Golf, an entity which provided
golf development services, filed an action alleging breach of contract against POBD, and sought
to foreclose its mechanic lien. R Vol. I, pp. 172-196. Genesis Golf named multiple other patties
whom had filed mechanic liens or mortgages against the real property. Id Amongst the numerous
defendants listed in the complaint were R.E. Loans, LLC ("REL"), Pensco Trust Co. custodian for
the benefit of Barney Ng ("Pensco"), Mmtgage Fund '08, LLC ("MF08"), and VP, Incorporated
("VP").
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Paragraph 40 of the Complaint indicated "Defendant VP may also claim an interest in the
Property in relation to the N Mortgage. Defendant VP's interest in the Pmperty or some portion
thereof, may be junior and subservient to Plaintiffs interest in the Property." R Vol. I, p. 178.
ACI Northwest, Inc. ("ACI") filed an answer, counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party
complaint on August 9, 2010. R Vol. II, pp. 204-227. ACI added Panhandle State Bank as a thirdparty defendant. Id.
On May 24, 2010, Pensco filed a special appearance. R Vol. II, pp. 201-203. MF08 filed
a special appearance on October 5, 2010. R Vol. II, pp. 228-232.
REL filed an appearance on October 14, 2010. R Vol. II, pp. 233-236. REL filed a "reply"
to ACI's cross-claim on Febmary4, 2011. R Vol. II,pp. 237-243. REL filed an answer to Genesis
Golfs complaint on April 21, 2011. R Vol. II, pp. 245-259. In its answer, REL admitted it had
assigned its interest, or a portion thereof, to Wells Fargo Foothill pursuant to the Collateral
Assignment of Mortgage and Loan Documents recorded on July 31, 2007. Id, at 1 3 8.
On September 29, 2011, the district comt entered a stay order due to a bankruptcy filed by
REL. Vol. II, pp. 275-283. On September 29, 2011, the district comt also entered a stay order
due to a bankruptcy filed by MF08. R Vol. II, pp.284-289.
On January 23, 2012, Wells Fm·go moved to dismiss the suit filed by Genesis Golf with
prejudice for failure to appear after withdrawal of its attorney. R Vol. II, pp. 298-301. This motion
was granted on March 16, 2012. R Vol. II, pp. 312-316.
On June 28, 2012, REL requested to lift its bankruptcy stay. RVol. II, pp. 317-324. An
order granting the request was entered August 24, 2012. R Vol. II, pp. 325-329. On June 26,
2013, REL moved with supporting pleadings to lift the MF08's bankruptcy stay. R Vol. III, pp.
336-361. An order granting the motion was entered August 12, 2013. RV. III, pp. 374-377.
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Thereafter, several patiies sought and obtained default judgments against Genesis Golf. R Vol.
III, pp. 362-365, 378-433.
On April 29, 2014, REL moved for summary judgment against ACI. R Vol. III, pp. 438450; Vol IV, pp. 451-487. Findings on REL's motion against ACI were entered July 21, 2014. R
Vol. V, pp. 647-652. A judgment declai·ing REL's m01igage lien superior to ACI's lien was
entered July 21, 2014. R Vol. V, pp. 674-652. 1
REL also moved for summary judgment against cross-claimant R. C. Worst & Company,
Inc. R Vol. IV, pp. 488-550; Vol. V, pp. 551-635. On June 2, 2014, an order was entered
dismissing R.C. Worst & Company's claims, counterclaims and cross claims pursuant to an oral
offer of resolution advanced to the trial court on May 28, 2014. R Vol. V, p.
On July 21, 2014, a motion and supp01iing pleadings were filed to substitute Valiant Idaho,
LLC ("Valiant'') in place of REL as the real party in interest. R Vol. V, pp. 656-666. An order
substituting Valiant in place of REL was entered August 7, 2014. R Vol. V, pp. 667-669.
On August 18, 2014, a motion to substitute Valiant as the real party in interest in place of
Wells Fmgo Capital Finance, LLC was filed with supporting pleadings. R Vol. V, p. 670-673;
Vol. VI, pp. 674-738. An order granting this motion was entered September 12, 2014. R Vol. VI,
pp. 781-783.
Although REL had previously answered and filed cross-claims against ACI and R.C.
Worst, and litigated those claims, on August 19, 2014, without leave of the district court, Valiant
(as assignee to REL) filed a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-patiy complaint for judicial
foreclosure. R Vol. VI, pp. 739-767. Valiant alleged it was info1med and believed, and on that
basis, alleged that the named cross-defendants claimed an interest in the property described in

1 Although

REL had assigned its interest in the mortgage to Wells Fargo Foothills, LLC, it does not appear ACI
challenged REL's standing to seek a declaration that REL had superior lien rights to ACI.
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Exhibit ''A" to the complaint, and indicated the real property described therein, and all
improvements thereon, would be referred to "as the Idaho Club Property." Id. at p. 746, 'if 33. VP
was named as a cross-defendant.
Valiant alleged breach of contract on the REL loan and alleged its damages were not less
than $708,000.00, plus additional interest, unpaid loan fees and late fees accruing under the REL
loan documents. Id. Valiant alleged it was entitled to judgment foreclosing the REL mortgage
and adjudicating the mortgage to be superior to and prior in right, title and interest to any right,
title or interest claimed by all defendants. Id at ,r 72. Valiant alleged the " ...judgment should,
pursuant to Idaho Code § 45-1302, specify the respective priority(ies) of Valiant's and each
Defendant's claims of right, title and interest in and to the Idaho Club Property, and adjudicate the
outstanding amounts secured by of the same." The complaint did not seek a quiet title against
VP. R Vol. VI, pp. 739-767. Valiant also alleged causes of action on the Pensco loan and the
MF08 loan although it had not been substituted as the real patty in interest for either of these
patties.
On October 3, 2014, VP accepted service ofValiant's counterclaim, cross-claim and thirdparty complaint. R Vol. VII, pp. 908-910. On October 6, 2014, VP filed a motion to dismiss the
counterclaim, cross-claim and third-patty complaint advanced by REL because it had been filed
without seeking leave of the district court as required by Rule 15, I.R.C.P ., and because it advanced
claims for Pensco and MF08, parties for whom Valiant had not been substituted. R Vol. VII, pp.
959-962.
On October 6, 2014, Valiant filed its motion with suppmting pleadings for Valiant to
substitute as the real pmty in interest for MF08 and Pensco. R. Vol. VIII, pp. 928-952. On
November 5, 2014, Valiant filed its motion for leave to file an amended answer to allege a
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counterclaim and cross-claim, and to serve its third-party complaint, together with its opposition
memorandum to VP's motion to dismiss. R Vol. VIII, pp. 977-995. VP filed its reply November
14, 2014. R Vol. X, pp. 1156-1159. On November 19, 2014, the district court issued its order
granting Valiant leave to serve its third-party complaint. R Vol. X, pp. 1156-1159. The district
court also entered an order granting Valiant leave to amend its answer to allege a counterclaim and
cross-claim and deemed the prior pleading filed August 19, 2014, served as the amended pleading
and deemed it filed as of August 19, 2014 (i.e. nunc pro tune). R Vol. X, pp. 1160-1163. 2 On
November 19, 2014, the district court entered its order denying VP's motion to dismiss. R Vol.
X,pp. 1174-1177.
On November 19, 2014, the district court entered two other orders, one substituting Valiant
as the real party in interest in place of Pensco, and the other substituting Valiant in place ofMF08.
R Vol. X, pp. 1168-1173.
On November 19, 2014, POBD stipulated to entry of judgment against it. R Vol. X, pp.
1178-1199. PO BD stipulated that it owed certain balances on the REL debt, the Pensco debt, and
the MF08 debt. Id. It also stipulated that Valiant had paid property taxes. Id.
On November 20, 2014, one day after granting Valiant leave to file its amended answer,
cross-claims and third-party complaint, the trial court issued its Order Setting Trial and Pretrial
Order which scheduled trial for August 24, 2015. R Vol. X, pp. 1270-1275.

2 It was improper for the district court to back date the filing. The power to amend nune pro tune is "a limited one,
and may be used only where necessaiy to c01Tect a clear mistake and prevent injustice. It does not imply the ability to
alter the substance of that which actually transpired or to backdate events to serve some other purpose." United States
v. Sumner, 226 F. 3d 1005, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2000) (intemal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Singh
v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 975 F.2d 321, 325 (7th Cir.
1992) (holding that "a nunc pro tune order is typically used to cotTect clerical or ministerial errors," but as a general
rule does not enable the comt to make "substantive changes affecting paities' rights"). However, since no statute of
limitations was affected by the en-or, it was hannless with respect to VP.
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On December 1, 2014, VP requested an extension of time to plead to the cross-claim
against it. R Vl. XI, pp. 1377-1378. The district cmut granted the motion. R. Vol. XI, p. 13791381. On December 11, 2014, VP answered the cross-claim filed against it. R. Vol. XII, pp. 15331540.
On January 20, 2015, Valiant moved for summary judgment against N, LLC; N01th Idaho
Resmts, LLC ("NIR"), and VP. R Vol. XIV, 1720-1724. Valiant filed a memorandum in support
of the summary judgment.

R Vol. XIV pp. 1725-1746.

Valiant also filed the supp01ting

Declaration of Jeff Sykes (R Vol. XIV, p. 1747-R Vol. XVI, p. 1911) and the Affidavit of Charles
Reeves (R Vol. XVII, p. 1912-XVIII, p. 2069).
On February 4, 2015, VP and NIR filed their joint memorandum in opposition to the
summary judgment. R Vol. XXI, pp. 23 59-23 71. VP also requested the comt take judicial notice
of a memorandum filed. by REL in Bonner County Case No. CV-2011-0135, Union Bankv. Pend
Oreille Bonner Development, LLC et al. 3 R Vol. XXI, pp. 2372-2391. The Affidavit of Richard

Villelli was also filed in opposition to the motion. R Vol. XXI, pp. 2392-2451.
Valiant filed its reply memorandum on March 11, 2015. R Vol. XXII, pp. 2547-2559. On
April 14, 2015, the district court entered its Memorandum Decision & Order Granting Valiant's
Motion for Summary Judgment against VP, North Idaho Resorts, LLC and JV, LLC. R Vol. XXII,
p. 2560-2578.
On April 28, 2015, JV filed its Motion to Alter, Amend and to Reconsider the Court's
Memorandum Decision and Order Filed 04/14/2015 and Request for Oral Argument Time/Date
for a Hearing; Not Yet to be Set. R Vol. XXII, p. 2579-2595. On April 29, 2015, VP filed a
motion for reconsideration and clarification. R Vol. XXII, pp. 2596-2597. VP filed a renewed

33

This district case was the subject ofan appeal decided by this Comt in Union Bank, N.A. v. North Idaho Resorts,

LLC, 161 Idaho 583,388 P.3d 907 (2017).
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motion for reconsideration and clarification on June 16, 2015, and a supporting memorandum. R
Vol. XXIV, pp. 2781-2798. On July 6, 2015, Valiant filed an opposition to the motion. R Vol.
XXIV, pp. 2804-2819. On July 6, 2015, VP filed its reply in support of its motion. R Vol. XXIV,
pp. 2820-2836.
On May 20, 2015, Valiant moved for entry of :final judgment, together with a supporting
memorandum and a declaration of Jeff Sykes and C. Dean Shafer in support of the motion for
entry of final judgment. R Vol. XXII,p. 2600- Vol. XXIII, p. 2748. On June 23, 2015, the district
court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Motion for Entry of Pinal Judgment.
R Vol. XXIV, pp. 2791-2798. VP objected to the proposed final judgment. R Vol. XXIV, pp.
2844-2846.
On July 21, 2015, the district court issued its memorandum decision and order on the
motion to reconsider on JV, NIR and VP's Motions to Reconsider and Valiant's Request for Entry
of a proposed Final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure and Sale. R. Vol. XXIV, p. 2856-2877.
On July 22, 2015, Valiant presented a motion for an order of sale on the real property,
supported by the Declarations ofC. Dean Shafer and Charles W. Reeves. R Vol. XXV, pp. 28802966. On August 4, 2015, VP objected to the motion for the order of sale as proposed by Valiant,
and supported the objection with the Declaration of Richard Villelli. R Vol. XXV, p. 2981- Vol.
XXVI, p. 3074. On August 5, 2015, the district court entered its Decree of Foreclosure and a
separate Judgment. R. Vol. XXVI, pp. 3075 - 3087.
VP filed a second motion to reconsider the judgment combined with a motion to alter and
amend the judgment on August 19, 2015.

R Vol. XXVII, p. 3114-3115.

A supp01ting

memorandum and suppo1ting affidavit of counsel were also filed on August 19, 2017. R Vol.
XXVII pp. 3116-3239. Valiant filed an opposition to VP and NIR's motion to reconsider, alter
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and amend on October 1, 2015. R Vol. XXXI, pp. 3721-3726. An en-ata con-ection to VP's
counsel's declaration was filed October 22, 2015. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 3988-3989. On October
22, 2015, VP filed a reply memorandum in support of its motion. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 3982-3985.
Valiant filed a motion to strike inadmissible evidence supporting VP' s motion to reconsider
on October 9, 2015. R. Vol. XXXI, pp. 3733-3736. A memorandum in support of the motion to
strike was also filed October 9, 2015. R Vol. XXXI, p. 3737-3745. On October 22, 2015, VP
filed a motion for enlargement of time to file its response. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 3986-3987. On
October 22, 2015, VP filed its opposition to Valiant's motion to strike.
On August 19, 2015, Valiant filed a motion to amend the decree of foreclosure. R Vol.
XXVII, pp. 3240-3243. The motion was suppmted by Valiant's memorandum. R Vol. XXVII,
pp. 3244-3248. Valiant also filed a Motion to Alter, Amend and/or Reconsider the Order of Sale
of Real Property. R Vol. XXVII, p. 3249-3252. The motion was supported by a memorandum,
as well as the Declaration of Chad M. Nicholson, Charles W. Reeves, and C. Dean Shafer. R Vol.
XXVIII, pp3523-3328.
VP filed a joint memorandum in opposition to Valiant's motion to amend the decree of
foreclosure and to alter, amend and/or reconsider the order of sale supported by the declaration of
Richard Villelli (including an enata correction). R Vol. XXIX, p. 3413 - 3498.
A hearing on the motion to reconsider and alter or amend filed by JV was held September
2, 2015. Motions Tr. pp. 185-216. At the hearing, the Court chose only to consider and rule upon

N's motion. Motions Tr. p. 188, 11. 7-24. The Court granted JV's motion. Id
On September 3, 2015, the Comt issued an Order Setting Trial and Pretrial Order, which
scheduled the matter for a court trial on January 25, 2016. R Vol. XXX, pp. 3521-3526.
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On September 4, 2015, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order
Granting in Part Reconsideration of the July 21, 2015 Memorandum Decision & Order. R. Vol.
XXX, pp. 3527 - 3532. R Vol. XXX, p. 3530. An order vacating the decree of foreclosure and
another order vacating the judgment were executed August 5, 2015, but not filed until September
17, 2015. R Vol. XXX, pp. 3549-3554.
On September 25, 2015, Valiant filed a pleading designated a Third Motion for Summary
Judgment. R Vol. XXXI, p. 3623-3626. On the same date, it filed a supporting memorandum and
the Declaration of Barney Ng in support of the Third Motion. R. Vol. XXXI, pp. 3627-3720.
On October 13, 2015, VP filed a memorandum in opposition to the third motion for
summary judgment. R Vol. XXXII, pp. 3810-3822. A declaration ofVP's counsel was filed
October 13, 2015, in opposition to Valiant's third motion for summary judgment. R Vol. XXXII,
pp. 3791-3809.

The Declaration of Richard Villelli was also filed on October 14, 2015 in

opposition to the third motion for summary judgment. R Vol. XXXII, p. 3828 - 3863. VP also
requested the district court take judicial notice of a declaration previously made by Barney Ng in
a separate judicial matter in California related to the loans made by REL in Idaho in opposition to
the third motion for summary judgment. R Vol. XXXII, p. 3823-3827. An errata correction to the
declaration ofVP's counsel was filed October 22, 2015. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 3988-3989.
Valiant filed its reply memorandum in support of its third motion for summary judgment
on October 21, 2015. R Vol. XXXIII, p. 3924-3939. On October 20, 2015, Valiant filed the
rebuttal declaration of Barney Ng in support ofits October 13, 2015 motion for summary judgment
which attempted to explain some of the statements made by Ng in the California litigation. R Vol.
XXXIII, p. 3906-3910. Valiant also filed a rebuttal declaration from Chad Nicholson on October
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20, 2015. R Vol. XXXIII pp. 3914-3923. VP moved to strike the rebuttals declarations of Ng and
Nicholson on October 22, 2015. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 3995-3999.
On October 16, 2015, Valiant filed a motion to strike the memoranda and declarations and
affidavits of VP, which incorporated the supporting declaration of Chad Nicholson.
XXXII, pp. 3864-3878.

R Vol.

VP opposed the motion to strike on October 16, 2015. R Vol. XXXII,

pp. 3879-3883. On October 20, 2015, Valiant filed a motion to sh01ten time to have its motion to
sb.'ike inadmissible evidence heard. R Vol. XXXIII, p. 3911-3913. On October 20, 2015, Valiant
also filed the Declaration of Chad Nicholson in support ofits motion to strike. R Vol. XXXIII, p.
3914-3923. Valiant filed its memorandum in support of its motion to strike on October 21, 2015.R
Vol. XXXIII, pp. 3962-3971.
Valiant filed a second motion to strike inadmissible evidence and a supp01ting
memorandum on October 20, 2015. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 3940-3952. VP opposed the motion by
memorandum filed October 22, 2015. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 3991-3994.
The district comt heard Valiant's and VP's motions on October 23, 2015. Motions Tr. pp.
217-313. A Memorandum Decision & Order re: Motions Heard on October 23, 2015 was filed
October 30, 2015. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 4000-4019.
The district court issued an amended notice of trial on October 21, 2015, moving the trial
from January 25, 2016 to January 28, 2016. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 3953-3954.
On December 15, 2015, Valiant filed a motion in limine seeking to limit VP' s evidence. R
Vol. XXXIV, pp. 4032-4033. A suppmting memorandum was filed the same date. R Vol.
XXXIV, pp. 4036 -XXXV 4050. The Declaration of Richard L. Stacey was filed in suppo1t of
Valiant' s motions in limine. R Vol. XXXV, pp. 4057-4204. VP responded to the motion in limine
on December 22, 2015. R Vol. XXXV, pp. 4221-4232. Valiant filed its reply on December 28,
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2015. R Vol. XXXV, pp. 4243-4252. Valiant also filed the Declaration of Chad Nicholson on
December 28, 2015 in support of its motion in limine. R Vol. XXXV, pp. 4258-4265.
The Court issued its Order re: Valiant Idaho LLC's Motion in Limine on December 29,
2015. R Vol. XXXV, pp. 4266-4268.
Trial proceeded on the matter. The first two days of trial occurred January 28, 2016, and
January 29, 2016. Tr. Vol. I,p. 7 and Tr. Vol. II, p. 279. The third and fourth days of trial occurred
on March 16, 2016, and March 17, 2016. Tr. Vol. III, pp. 555 and 775.
The district court entered its judgment on June 22, 2016. R Vol. XXXVII, p. 4619- Vol.
XL, p. 4909. A separate Decree of Foreclosure was entered June 22, 2016. R. Vol. XL, p. 4910 XLI, p. 4940.
On June 22, 2016, Valiant filed a Motion for an Order of Sale of Real Prope1iy supported
by a memorandum. R Vol. XLI, pp. 4985-5014. VP opposed the order of sale. R Vol. XLI, p.
5015-5018. On July 14, 2016, the Comi entered its Order re: Order of Sale of Real Prope1iy. R
Vol. XLIII, pp. 5270-5273.
On July 6, 2016, the district comi held a hearing on the form of the judgment and decree
of foreclosure which were entered because they omitted N's priority and the property description
of the prope1iy encumbered by JV's lien. R Vol. XLIII, pp. 526-5265. An order vacating the
judgment was entered July 14, 2016. R Vol. XLIII, pp. 5266-5267. An order vacating the Decree
of Foreclosure was also entered on July 14, 2016. R Vol. XLIII, pp. 5268-5270.
On July 18, 2016, the trial comi entered an order requiring all paiiies to submit to it
proposed judgments and decrees no later than July 15, 2016, which included the legal description
of the properties encumbered by JV in the legal description. 4 Id On July 18, 2016, the district

4

The dates set fmih in this paragraph do not contain an e1rnr.
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court entered its Order re: Proposed Judgment and Proposed Decree of Foreclosure indicating it
intended to adopt the proposed Judgement and Proposed Decree of Foreclosure submitted by
Valiant. R Vol. XLIII, pp. 5303-5305. On July 20, 2016, the district court entered its Decree of
Foreclosure. R Vol. XLIV pp. 5317-5412. On July 20, 2016, the district court also entered its
Judgment. R Vol. XLV pp. 5413-5502.
Valiant filed its Memorandum of costs and attorney fees on July 6, 2016, together with a
supporting declaration. R Vol. XLI, p. 5019 - XLII, p. 5263. On July 20, 2016, VP filed its
opposition to Valiant's memorandum of costs and attorney fees. Vol. XLV, pp. 5503-5520. On
August 10, 2016, VP filed the Declaration of Richard Stacey in response to VP and N's objections
to costs and attorney fees. R Vol. XLVI pp. 5591-5672. Valiant also filed a memorandum in
response to VP's objection to costs and attorney fees. R Vol. XLVII, pp. 5746-5769. The trial
collli entered its Memorandum Decision Order Awarding Costs and Attorney's Fees to Valiant
Idaho, LLC on August 22, 2016. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5829-5843. A judgment re: Costs and
Attorneys' Fees was entered August 22, 2016. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5844-5846.
On August 3, 2016, VP moved for a new trial on the limited issue of Valiant' s belated
claims aTising at trial that it was entitled to an award of damages for operating losses and damages
from an alleged oil spill.

R Vol. XLV pp. 5542-5545.

The motion was suppmied by a

memorandum and affidavit of counsel. R Vol. XLV p. 5546-5552. Valiant filed an opposition to
the motion on August 10, 2016. R Vol. XLVI pp. 5577-5583. The opposition was supported by
the Declaration of Jeff Sykes. R Vol. XLVII, pp. 5714-5727. VP filed its reply memorandum on
August 15, 2016. R Vol. XLVII, pp. 5787-5792. The district collli entered its Memorandum
Decision Order Denying VP's motion for new trial on August 25, 2016. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 59065919.
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On August 2, 2016, JV filed a motion to alter, amend and reconsider the Judgment and
Decree of Foreclosure. R Vol. XLV, pp. 5521-5539. On August 3, 2016, the trial court entered
its order denying JV's request for oral argument. R Vol. XLV pp. 5540-5541. On August 3, 2016,
VP also moved for a motion to alter, amend and reconsider the Decree of Foreclosure and
Judgment, together with a supporting memorandum submitted August 3, 2016, which was not filed
by the Clerk of Comi until August 4, 2016. R Vol. XLVI pp. 5553-5574. As with JV, the district
court denied oral argument on the motion. R Vol. XLVI p. 5575-5576. Valiant filed an opposition
to VP's and JV's motions to alter, amend and reconsider on August 10, 2016. R Vol. XLVI pp.
5584-5590; Vol. XLVI pp. 5673-5681. The district comi entered its memorandum decision
denying VP's and JV's motions to alter, amend and reconsider on August 16, 2017. R Vol. XLVII
p. 5793- XLVIII p. 5814.
On August 10, 2016, Valiant moved for sanctions against JV, VP and NIR for filing their
motions for reconsideration in the matter. R Vol. XLVII, pp. 5682-5684. The motion was
supported by the declaration of Richard Stacey. R Vol. XLVII, pp. 5685-5713. A supp011ing
memorandum was filed August 11, 2016. R Vol. XLVII, pp. 5770-5786. On August 24, 2016,
VP and NIR filed their memorandum in opposition to Valiant's motion for sanctions. R Vol.
XLVIII, pp. 5886-5919.

The Declaration of Daniel M. Keyes was filed in support of the

opposition. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5886-5919. On August 29, 2016, the district court entered its
Memorandum Decision Order denying the motion for sanctions. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5925-2940.
On September 21, 2014, the clerk issued a writ of execution on the judgment. R Vol. LII,
p. 6318- LIII, p. 6506. The sheriffs service on the writ of execution, notice oflevy under the writ
and notice of sheriffs sale were all filed on September 21, 2016. R Vol. LIII, pp. 6507-6561. On
October 5, 2016, Valiant filed the application and declaration of Richard L. Stacey for writ of
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execution. R Vol. LIV, pp. 6608-6610. A Writ of Execution was filed October 5, 2016. Vol.
LIV, pp. 6611-LVI, p. 6803. An application for a writ of execution against VP was filed October
6, 2016. R Vol. LVI, pp. 6820-6827.
On September 9, 2016, NIR appealed. R Vol. XLIX, p. 5941-LI, p. 6136. On September
20, 2016, N appealed. R Vol. LI, pp. 6137 - p. LII, p. 6312. On October 6, 2016, VP appealed.
R Vol. LVI, pp. 6828 -LVII, p. 7030. On May 25, 2017, VP filed an amended notice of appeal.
R Vol. LXXIX, pp. 9931-9946.
On September 21, 2016, Valiant filed a motion for relief from the fourteen-day automatic
stay, supported by the declaration of Richard Stacey. R Vol. LIV, pp. 6566-6577. On September
23, 2016, the district court denied Valiant oral argument on its motion. R Vol. LIV, pp. 65785680. VP and NIR filed a memorandum in opposition to motion for relief from automatic stay on
September 28, 2016. R Vol. LIV, pp. 6597 -6602. Valiant filed its reply on September 29, 2016.
R Vol. LIV, pp. 6603-6607. The trial court granted Valiant's motion for relief from the automatic
stay on October 7, 2016. R Vol. LIX, pp. 7230-7237.
On December 22, 2016, the Bonner County Sheriff filed a Notice of Levy Under Writ of
Execution, Notice of Sheriff's Sale and Sheriffs Certificates of Sale. R Vol. LXII, p. 7657 LXVI p. 8227. The Bonner County Sheriff filed several Sheriffs Certificates of Sale. R Vol.
LXII, p. 7747 - LXV, p. 9445.
On February 8, 2017, Valiant filed a motion to enforce the district court's judgment under
IAR 13(b)(10) and 13(b)(13), together with a supporting memorandum and declaration of counsel.
R Vol. LXVII, p. 8268- Vol. LXX, p. 8708. VP filed its opposition to Valiant's motion to enforce
the judgment on February 27, 2017, together with the supporting declaration of Richard Villelli
and Daniel Keyes. R Vol. LXX, p. 8746- LXXI, p. 8821. Valiant filed its reply memorandum on
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February 22, 2017, and a declaration by its counsel in rebuttal. R Vol. LXXI, p. 8827- Vol. LXXV,
p. 9340. The Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order granting Valiant's motion to
enforce the judgment on March 6, 2017. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9341-9360. The district court also
issued a Writ of Assistance. R Vol. LXXV pp. 9361-9386.
On March 20, 2017, Valiant filed its motion to clarify the CoU1t's memorandum decision
and order granting its motion to enforce the judgment against VP, together with a supporting
memorandum and notice of hearing. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9399-9412. VP filed its response on
March 29, 2017. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9424-9435. Valiant filed its reply on April 3, 2017. R Vol.
LXXV, pp. 9436-9445. The trial court issued its memorandum decision on the motion to clarify
on April 27, 2017. R Vol. LXXIX, pp. 9861-9870.
On March 7, 2017, VP filed its motion for an order allowing the continued use and access
to Parcels 1 and 2 of the judgment to allow VP to continue to provide water and sewer services to
its customers, and an application pmsuant to I.A.R. 13 for stay of the enforcement of the writ of
assistance pending appeal, with no request for oral argument. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9388- 9398. On
March 27, 2017, the district court issued an Order Requesting Response Brief from Valiant Idaho,
LLC with respect to the motion for the stay. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9413-414. On March 28, 2017,
Valiant noticed for hearing VP's motion for the order allowing the use and access to Parcels 1 and
2, and the stay on appeal. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9415-9417. Valiant also requested an extension to
respond to VP's motion for an order allowing use and access to Parcels 1 and 2, and application
for stay of enforcement of the judgment. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9418-9420. On March 28, 2017, the
district coU1t granted Valiant's motion for an extension to respond to VP's motion. R Vol. LXXV,
p. 9421-9423. On April 11, 2017, Valiant filed its memorandum in opposition VP' s motion for
access to Parcels 1 and 2, and stay of enforcement of the judgment. R Vol. LXXVII, pp. 9665-
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9682. The opposition was supported by the declarations of William Habe1man and Steven Cordes.
R Vol. LXXVI, pp. 9455-9634. VP filed its reply memorandum in support of its motion for access
and stay on appeal on April 17, 2017, together with the declaration of Richard Villelli. R Vol.
LXXVIII, pp. 9745-9789.
On April 13, 2017, Valiant filed a motion requesting a post-judgment temporary restraining
order and post-judgment preliminary injunction against VP to restrain VP from discontinuing
supplying water and sewer service to Valiant and others, except for operation of the sewer lagoon,
supported by a memorandum, and the declarations of counsel and William Habe1man. R Vol.
LXXVII, pp. 9683- Vol. LXVIII, p. 9704. On April 13, 2017, the district comt issued a temporary
restraining order prohibiting VP from complying with the district court's previously issued writ of
assistance. R Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 9707-9710. Thereafter, Valiant filed a notice of deposit of a
bond. R Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 9711-9713.
VP moved to dissolve the temporary restraining order on April 17, 201 7, together with a
supporting memorandum. R Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 9714-9732. Valiant requested an enlargement of
time to respond to the VP's motion to dissolve, supported by the declaration of Chad Nicholson.
R. Vol. LXXVIII, p. 9733-9741. The Comi granted the motion to enlarge. R Vol. LXXVIII, p.
9742-9744. On April 18, 2017, Valiant filed its opposition to the motion to dissolve the temporary
restraining order, together with the supporting declarations of Richard Stacey and William
Haberman. R Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 9790-9818. The district comi entered an order extending the
post-judgment temporary restraining order against VP on Ap1il 20, 2017. R. Vol. LXXVIII, pp.
9819-9822. On April 26, 2017, the district court denied VP's motion for stay on appeal and issued
a post-judgment injunction against VP prohibiting it from complying with the district comi's
previously issued order to vacate from the foreclosed lots. R Vol. LXXIX, pp. 9853-9860.
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C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The appeal of this matter encompasses various aspects of the above proceedings. The first
aspect is the grant of summary judgment against VP. The second aspect is error in the entry of
judgment. The third aspect is the district court's issuance of a post-judgment temporary restraining
order and injunction. The final aspect is the award of costs against VP. A statement of facts for
each of these aspects would be disjointed. Therefore, the relevant facts are included prior to the
argument addressing each discrete aspect.
II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the district court err in granting a summary judgment against VP and adjudging
Valiant took free and clear of any right VP claimed for the right to maintain and
operate its water and sewer systems within the foreclosed lots in the Idaho Club?

2.

Did the district court err in declaring the rights and relationships of the unknown
purchasers at foreclosure when there was no case or controversy before the district
court upon which to enter a declaratory judgment on these issues?

3.

Did the district court err by granting a post-judgment temporary restraining order
followed by a preliminaiy injunction against VP?

4.

Did the district court en· in its cost award against VP?

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Because there is more than one issne on appeal, different standai·ds apply. The relevant
standards are as follows:
l.

Summary Judgment: This Comi reiterated its standai·d of review on a sununary

judgment brought prior to the change to Rule 56, I.R.C.P, in Nettleton v. Canyon Outdoor Media,
LLC, _

Idaho _ , _

P .3d _

(Docket No. 44416 released 12/21/17), wherein this Comi

ruled:
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This Court applies the same standard of review that was used by the trial court in
mling on a motion for summary judgment. Quemada v. Arizmendez, 153 Idaho 609,
612, 288 P.3d 826, 829 (2012) (quoting V,•eeken v. Lockwood Eng'g, B. V., 148
Idaho 89, 101, 218 P.3d 1150, 1162 (2009)). Summary judgment is proper 11 if the
pleadings, depositions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
j~dgment as a matter of law. 11 I.R.C.P. 56(c). "[T]his Court construes disputed
facts, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record, in favor of
the non-moving pruty. 11 Grabicki v. City ofLewiston, 154 Idaho 686,690,302 P.3d
26, 30 (2013) (internal citation omitted). "The nonmoving party must submit more
than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact exists to establish a
genuine issue. 11 Nw. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d
263, 266 (2002) (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, 11 [t]he moving pruty is
entitled to judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that
party will beru· the burden of proof at trial." Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102,
765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)).
2.

Abuse of discretion: "This Court engages in a three-part inquiry when reviewing

for an abuse of discretion: '(1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the boundruies of such discretion and consistently
with any legal standru·ds applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason."' Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 182, 384 P.3d 943, 946
(2016).

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT AGAINST VP
1.

Statement of Facts

On January 20, 2015, Valiant filed a motion for summary judgment seeking a judgment
"that the m01tgages assigned to Valiant by R.E. Loans, LLC, Pensco Trust Co. and Mmtgage Fund
'08 LLC are senior and superior to any and all interest claimed by [JV, NIR, and VP] in and to"
the subject real prope1ty. R Vol. XIV, p. 1722. The supp01ting memorandum filed by Valiant
sought a "judgment that its Mo1tgages ... [were] senior in right and priority to any interest claimed
by ... VP .. .in the POBD Property." R Vol. XIV, p. 1727.
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The motion was supported by a memorandum. R Vol. XIV, pp. 1725-1744. Valiant's
introduction in its memorandum explained it was seeking summary judgment that its mortgages
were senior in right and priority to any interest of VP in the POBD Property which it claimed was
more paiticulru·ly described in Exhibit 1 to the declaration of Jeff Sykes. R Vol. XIV, p. 1727.
The introduction continued that the POBD Property and all improvements thereon were referred
to as the "Idaho Club Property". Id. Valiant indicated it sought summary judgment pursuant to
the fomth, fifth and sixth causes of action in its complaint to foreclose the assigned mmtgages of
REL, Pensco and MF08, and a judgment that its interest in the foreclosed lot within the Idaho Club
Prope1ty was superior and senior in right, title and interest to any interest claimed by Claimants in
the Idaho Club Prope1ty. R Vol. XIV, p. 1732. The memorandum also indicated it sought to
foreclose its redemption deed and sought a foreclosure of claimants' interest in the redemption real
property (as opposed to the Idaho Club Property previously defined in the memorandum.) Id.
Nothing in the memorandum indicated Valiant sought a decree of quiet title against VP in the
foreclosed lots.
The declaration of Jeff Sykes, counsel for Valiant, included a legal description in Exhibit
1 with no explanation of its origin. R Vol. XV, p. 1749, ,i 2. The legal description did not match
the legal description attached to the Counterclaim, Cross-claim and Third-Party Complaint filed
by Valiant on August 19, 2014. R Vol. VI, pp. 739-767.
Regarding VP, Valiant acknowledged in the memorandum in support of summary
judgment that VP in its answer to the cross-claim had specifically denied that Valiant had a
superior interest in lots containing water and sewer infrastructure (the lagoon lots and the well lots)
and its utility easements. R Vol. XIV pp. 1735-1738. In its argument, Valiant asserted as a
relevant fact that a thorough review of the real prope1ty records of Bonner County revealed that
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VP had no recorded interest in any of the Idaho Club Prope1ty which was recorded prior to the
REL, Pensco or MF08 mortgage. R Vol. XIV, p. 1742. No declaration or other evidence was
submitted by Valiant which supported its claim that a thorough review of the Bonner County
records was made, who made it, what records were allegedly reviewed, when the review occuned,
or how the conclusion was reached that VP had no recorded interest in the Idaho Club Prope1ty.

Id. Valiant concluded with the argument that VP could establish no basis under which any claim
it may have in the Idaho Club Prope1ty was senior to Valiant's interests. Id.
VP opposed Valiant's motion for summary judgement identifying the following interests
with priority over mortgages assigned to Valiant: (1) one of its deeded lots was not encumbered
by any ofValiant's mortgages, (2) prescriptive easements throughout the subject prope1ty, and (3)
equitable interests and servitudes within the subject prope1ty. R Vol. XXI, pp. 2359-2371. VP
maintained that Valiant did not address these interests. Id. 5
VP also raised the issue that the legal descriptions of the real prope1ty for which summary
judgment was sought did not match those of the REL, Pensco and MF08 mmtgages. R Vol. XXI,
pp. 2361, 2364. VP specifically denied that the legal description of the MF08 lien encompassed
one of the lots (Lot 2, Block 17 of the replat of Golden Tee Estates and Golden Tee Estates 1st
Addition as recorded in Book 8 of Plats, Page 77). R Vol. XXI, p. 2369.
VP suppmted its opposition with the Declaration of Richard Villelli, which contained
testimony in support of VP's claims. R Vol. XXI, pp. 2392-2451. In this declaration, Villelli
indicated he was the president of Villelli Enterprises, Inc., which was the managing member of
NIR. R Vol. XXI, p. 2393, ,r 2. Villelli also testified he was the President of VP. Id,

,r 3.

It is undisputed that DEQ required POBD to deed four (4) lots as part of a Compliance Agreement when POBD
failed to comply with licensing requirements. However, these deeds would not have merged VP's easement and
equitable servitude interest. See Wilson v. Dnder, 123 P. 487, 21 Idaho 76 (1912) (holding that merger will not
apply when it proves inequitable or to the disadvantage of the person who is honestly seeking to protect his rights).

5

20

Villelli introduced as Exhibit "A" the Third Amended and Restated Real Property Purchase
and Sale Agreement ("PSA") by which POBD's predecessor acquired the Idaho Club propetty
from NIR on March 9, 2006. R Vol. XXI, p. 2393,

,r 5.

The PSA indicated NIR owned both

developed and undeveloped real propetty in Bonner County, Idaho. R Vol. XXI, p. 2398. The
PSA specifically excluded VP's domestic water rights, easements for operation and delivery of
domestic water and sewer service including the sewer lagoon and land application. R Vol. XXI,
p. 2399. The PSA specified VP owned the domestic water and sanitary sewer systems which
currently served and would serve the project. R Vol. XXI, p. 2433b-2433c. It recognized that the
system was also cunently serving the Hidden Lakes community. Id. It committed VP to provide
capacity to the project (now known as the Idaho Club). Id. A condition precedent to the closing
was that VP had to provide POBD with a "will serve" letter to provide water and sewer to the
project. R Vol. XXI, p. 2424. The PSA contained a non-merger clause. R Vol. XXI, p. 2433 g.
Patt of the Rights and Obligations section of the PSA included a section identified as
"planning work" and recognized the buyer would be seeking entitlements to the property. R Vol.
XXI, pp. 2413-2414. The seller was required to cooperate with the buyer to secure entitlements
to develop the property. R Vol. XXI, p. 2417. The entitlements included approval of the extension
ofVP's water and sewer systems to serve the lands POBD was developing as the Idaho Club. R
Vol. XXI, pp. 2413-2414, 2436.
Villelli testified, consistent with the tetms of the PSA, that VP entered into a Constrnction
and Opera,ting Agreement on June 13, 2006, which addressed POBD's extension ofVP's existing
water and sewer systems, much of which had been in place for over 20 years and required VP to
operate the systems. R Vol. XXI, p. 2395,
agreed. R Vol. XXI, p. 2395,

,r 11.

,r

10. Villelli testified VP operated the systems as

Villelli also testified the agreement required POBD to grant
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easements for the areas where the systems were extended, and required POBD to deed the lots
upon which the sewer lagoons and water systems were located. Id Villelli further testified Idaho
Department of Environmental Quality later required POBD to deed the four lots upon which the
sewer lagoons, water towers and pumping stations were situated in connection with a compliance
agreement. Id
On April 14, 2015, the district court entered its memorandum decision and order granting
Valiant's motion for summary judgment. R Vol. XXII, pp. 2560-2578. Regarding the legal
description, in a footnote to the decision, the district court indicated the property against which it
was granting foreclosure was particularly described in Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Jeff Sykes.
R Vol. XXII, p. 2561, footnote 1. The district court's decision neglected to address the prescriptive
easement and equitable servitude interests raised by VP in its opposition and simply compared the
recording dates of various recorded interests in the real property to determine priority of those
recorded interests, concluding: "VP's only alleged interests were recorded on June 13, 2011, and
May 20, 2014 - several years after the 2007 RE Loans M01tgage, Pensco Mortgage and MF08
Mortgage - and are, thus, found to be junior to those M01tgages as a matter of law." R Vol. XXI,
p. 2574.
VP filed a motion to reconsider the court's summary judgment memorandum decision and
order. R Vol XXIV, pp. 2783-2789. On July 21, 2015, the district court entered its memorandum
decision and order on VP's motion to reconsider and again upheld its grant of summary judgment
to Valiant, but altered some ofits reasoning. R. Vol. XXIV, pp. 2856-2877. Regarding the legal
description challenge raised by VP, even though the disu·ict coutt had previously granted a
complete summary judgment to Valiant,. the district comt deemed a subsequent Motion for Entry
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of Final Judgment filed by Valiant, and supported by the declaration ofa title officer, to constitute
an unopposed second motion for summary judgment. Id
The district court upheld its dismissal of VP's claims for prescriptive easements and
equitable servitudes because "VP [did not plead] these claims in its pleadings, nor [raise] them in
its response to Valiant's motion for summary judgment" and therefore, they "did not survive
Valiant's motion for summary judgment." R Vol. XXIV, p. 2874.
On August 4, 2015, VP introduced the Declaration of Richard Villelli in opposition to the
order of sale at foreclosure. R Vol. XXVI, pp. 2987-3074. Villelli, President of VP, and the
President ofVillelli Enterprises, Inc., which was the manager ofNIR, testified to the following:
(1) In 1995, VP purchased an existing water system from JV, LLC which serviced lots in
the Hidden Lakes subdivision in Bonner County, and was created and installed in 1985.
The purchase included all the existing infrastrncture, easements, operating permits, a
well, and a water reservoir.
(2) In 1995, VP, Inc. purchased an existing sewer system from JV, LLC. At the time of
purchase, the sewer system purchase included an existing lagoon, all infrastructure, an
assignment of easements, lift stations and operating permits.

The sewer system

serviced the Hidden Lakes Golf Course, tlu·ee existing subdivisions, a maintenance
facility and an existing club house. Id. The sewer system was installed in 1985.
(3) Since the purchase of the water and sewer systems, VP had continuously held all
necessary permits to operate the water and sewer system which now also serviced
pmiions of the Idaho Club properties.
(4) In 2000, the water and sewer systems were extended by VP to serve 49 lots in the
Golden Tee Estates and Golden Tee Estates First Addition subdivisions.
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(5) In 2004, NIR began negotiations with MDG Nevada, Inc., and its affiliate, Pend Oreille
Bonner Investments, LLC, regarding the sale of undeveloped real property in Bonner
County which surrounded and lay in the general vicinity of the Golden Tee Estates and
Golden Tee Estates First Addition subdivisions.
(6) The Third Amended and Restated Real Property and Purchase Agreement (PSA)
excluded the water and sewer systems. The PSA allowed the developer to expand the
sewer and water system to serve the Idaho Club project so long as the developer paid
for and constructed any expansion of the sewer and water system at its own expense
and transferred ownership of those improvements to VP as called for in both the
Conditional Use Permit (CUP) and Planned Unit Development (PUD) submissions to
Bonner County. To suppmt this testimony, a copy of the PSA, and a copy of the will
serve letter provided to POBD were supplied to the district court.
(7) On June 13, 2006, VP entered into a Construction and Operation Agreement ("COA")
with POBD. The subject of the COA was "construction and operation of the sewer and
water systems which VP owns ... " The Agreement allowed POBD to extend VP's water
and sewer systems to serve prope1ties owned by Pend Oreille Bonner Development
Holdings, Inc (POBD's predecessm).

The agreement required POBD to grant

easements for all extensions ofVP's system. A copy of this agreement was provided
to the district court.
(8) POBD proceeded to submit plats to Bonner County for approval.

VP, Inc. was

requested to issue a will serve letter in connection with the plats, and subsequently
reviewed the plats. All plats contained a "Water and Sewer Service Note" which
indicated that all Lots shown on the Plat will receive water and sewer service from VP,

24

Inc. (PWS No. 1090195.) Each plat also contained a reference to a lienholder's
certificate filed by REL agreeing to the subdivisions as shown on the plat recorded in
Bonner County as Instrument No. 714036. The plats showed the water and sewer
system extension easements on the face of the plats. On July 7, 2005, VP's Director of
Operations issued a will serve letter for the Idaho Club. A copy of the will serve letter
was supplied to the district collli.
(9) After the purchase of the property, POBD relocated the land application area for the
sewer system effluent.

POBD obtained a permit from the Idaho Department of

Environmental Quality (DEQ) for the new land application. The permit number was
LA 0000123-02. POBD identified VP as the Responsible Official in the permit. The
pe11nit applied only to the land application of effluent and did not replace or modify
any ofVP's existing permits.
(10)

Pursuant to the parties' agreement, POBD began paying Bob Hansen of Water

System Management for his services in overseeing the land application of effluent to
the golf course. POBD subsequently defaulted on paying Bob Hansen and VP resumed
paying for his services.
(11)

In 2008 and 2009, VP was contacted by DEQ regarding failure by POBD to comply

with the land application permit, and was required to request two emergency
extensions.
(12)

By letter dated February 14, 2011, DEQ sent a non-compliance letter to Chuck

Reeves, manager of POBD, copied to VP. A copy of th~ non-compliance letter was
provided to the district court.
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(13)

By letter dated April 15, 2011, DEQ issued a Notice of Violation to POBD, which

was copied to VP. A copy of the letter and notice of violation issued by DEQ were
provided to the district court.
(14)

On July 8, 2011, DEQ distributed a consent order with POBD, which was sent to

VP. A copy of the consent order was provided to the district court.
(15)

On April 3, 2012, DEQ sent a non-compliance letter to POBD, which was copied

to VP. A copy of the letter was provided to the district comt.
(16)

On September 11, 2013, DEQ entered into a Compliance Agreement Schedule with

POBD and VP. The terms of the compliance agreement required POBD to deed fom
lots to VP upon which the wastewater lagoon, water reservoir, well reservoir and
booster pumps were situated by September 13, 2013. A copy of this agreement was
provided to the district court.
(17)

On September 20, 2013, POBD quitclaimed these four lots to VP in compliance

with DEQ's requirements. A copy of the recorded deeds was provided to the district
comt.
(18)

Following the recording of the deeds, VP paid all past due real property taxes owed

to Bonner County and continued to pay taxes as they came due. These lots were not
prut of the tax redemption with Bonner County.
(19)

Bonner County assessed these parcels as "common area" of the Idaho Club.

(20)

Every individual parcel that receives water and sewer service has entered into a

service agreement with VP.
R Vol. XXVI, pp. 2987 -3074.
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Following filing of this declaration, on August 19, 2015, VP then filed a second motion to
reconsider the summary judgment supported by an additional declaration of counsel.

The

memorandum reiterated the primary arguments that VP had raised in its previous pleadings
regarding prescriptive easements and equitable servitudes and sought a detennination on the merits
by the district court. R Vol. XXVII, pp. 3116-3132.
On October 23, 2015, the district court entered a memorandum decision and order on VP's
second motion to reconsider, and for the first time in more than nine (9) months since VP first
raised claims of prescriptive easements and equitable servitudes, addressed those substantive
issues. The district court denied the motion finding VP failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish a genuine issue of material fact. R Vol. XXXIII, pp. 4010-4013.
The district court issued a Decree of Foreclosure following its entry of final judgment.
Clause 5 of the Decree of Foreclosure provided:
5.
In accordance with the Valiant Mortgages, each Parcel ofldaho
Club Prope1ty that is sold at the foreclosure sale shall include the prope1ty
rights appurtenant to, located on or under, and existing in conjunction with
said Parcel, including, but not limited to:
a. All easements, rights-of-way, water rights of every kind and nature
(including, but not limited to, claims, decrees, applications, permits,
licenses, storage rights, ditches and ditch rights, riparian and littoral rights),
rights to timber to be cut, minerals and mineral rights, rights of use or
occupancy, privileges, franchises, tenements, appendages, hereditaments
and appurtenances and all other rights thereunto belonging or in any way
appe1taining to said Parcel, either at law or in equity, in possession or in
expectancy;
b. All fixtures, structures, buildings and improvements of every kind and
description located on or under said Parcel, including, but not limited to,
all ... utilities ...
R Vol. XLIV, p. 5321.
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2.

Introduction

The district court's holding that VP failed to present genuine issues of material fact in
opposition to Valiant's motion for summary judgment was erroneous. Even were this Court to
determine that Valiant's motion for summary judgment sufficiently raised the issue of quiet title,
VP's opposition presented material facts that should have prevented the entTy of summary
judgment in favor of Valiant. The two Villelli declarations sufficiently raised genuine issues of
material fact whether VP had prescriptive easement rights that arose before the mortgages
encumbered the subject property, and whether VP had equitable servitudes that could not be
foreclosed.
To oppose and defeat a motion for summary judgment "affidavits or other proof must be
presented to the court to set fmih the specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue existing
for trial." Brown v. Matthews Mortuary, Inc., 118 Idaho 830, 833, 801 P.2d 37, 40 (1990); I.R.C.P.
56(e). Before that burden is placed upon the opposing pai.iy the movant must first challenge an
element of the non-movant's defense or affirmative defense. Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, Inc.,
126 Idaho 527,531,887 P.2d 1034, 1038 (1994).
In this case, Valiant's motion for summary judgment simply contended that a thorough
review of the real property records of Bonner County revealed VP had no recorded interest in any
of the Idaho Club Property which was recorded prior to Valiant's assigned mortgages. However,
this bald statement was unsuppmied by any evidence of who allegedly made these reviews, or
what items they allegedly reviewed at Bonner County, or when this review was allegedly made.
Valiant only submitted the uncertified copies of the four infrastructure lots DEQ required POBD
to convey to VP which were recorded after the REL, Pensco, and MF08 mmigages, as support of
its claims that VP's interest was inferior to Valiant's. R Vol. XIV, pp. 1735-1738.
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As noted in the statement of facts, VP initially submitted the declaration of Richard Villelli
in opposition to Valiant' s motion. VP subsequently submitted another declaration of Richard
Villelli which expanded upon the information contained in the first declaration regarding VP's
infrastmcture. Despite having both of these declarations before it, the district court denied VP' s
second motion to reconsider, finding they provided insufficient evidence of any material fact.
On appeal, VP contends the district comi erred because the declarations, and the materials
submitted with them, presented genuine issues of material fact with respect to the following issues,
each of which should have prevented the distdct court from entering summary judgment in favor
of Valiant: (1) whether Valiant's summary judgment legal description was encumbered by the
mo1igages it was foreclosing; (2) whether VP had senior prescriptive easement rights; and (3)
whether VP had senior equitable servitudes.

3.

The district court erred in granting foreclosure of property using a
different legal description than contained in the foreclosed mortgages

The legal descriptions of 23 items (154 parcels in total) of real property Valiant claimed
were encumbered by the mortgages it sought to foreclose were presented at summary judgment as
an exhibit to the Declaration of Jeff R. Sykes. R. Vol. XV, pp. 1747-1763. No foundation or
testimony was presented to the district comt at summaiy judgment which explained how the
substituted Sykes legal descriptions were derived. 6 The Sykes legal descdption did not match the
legal descriptions contained in the REL m01igage (R Vol. XVII, pp. 1962-1993); the Pensco
m01igage (R Vol. XVII, pp. 2001-2030); and the MF08 mortgage (R Vol. XVIII, pp. 2039-2069.)
For instance, the Sykes legal description identified Lot 2, Block 17 of the Replat of Golden Tee
Estates and Golden Tee Estates 1st Addition as paii of the "Parcel 4" legal description. R Vol. XV,

6 The Sykes declaration does not contain any statement of affirmation that the declarant, Jeff Sykes, has any
personal lmowledge of the converted legal descriptions.
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p. 1758. Yet this lot was not included in the legal descriptions of any either the Pensco mortgage
or the MF'08 mortgage. R Vol. XVII, p. 2022; R Vol. XVIII, p. 2061.
VP maintained in summary judgment that the trial court could not declare seniority and
foreclose against the requested real property when the legal descriptions upon which foreclosure
was sought did not match the legal description of the mortgages unless there was evidence
presented of the correlation to the mortgaged property descriptions, or an explanation of how the
substituted property legal descriptions were derived. R Vol. XXI, pp. 2361-2365; Tr. p. 44, L. 2
- p. 45, L. 5 (March 18, 2015). Yet, the district court granted summary judgment adopting the
Sykes legal descriptions. R Vol. XXII, p. 2561, footnote 1.
Shortly after the trial court granted a complete summary judgment in favor of Valiant
declaring foreclosure against the real property described in the Sykes declaration, Valiant
submitted its Motion for Entry of Final Judgment pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil
Procedure. R Vol. XXII, p. 2602. In support of its motion for entry of final judgment, Valiant
filed declarations of Jeff Sykes and Dean Shafer, a title officer. R Vol. XXII, p. 2600- Vol. XXIII,
p. 2748. The Sykes Declaration stated that Valiant purchased a litigation guarantee in aid of its
foreclosure action and attached the legal description of the land referred to in the litigation
guarantee as an exhibit to the declaration. R Vol. XXIII, p. 2614. The Shafer Declaration stated
that Shafer, a title officer, had compared the legal descriptions of real property from the litigation
guai·antee with the property described in each of the Valiant mortgages and the redemption deed
and based upon his expe1i opinion, the legal descriptions "accurately describes the real prope1iy
described in the Valiant Encumbrances, subtracting the parcels released from the Valiant
Encumbrances, and which Valiant is entitled to foreclose." R Vol. XXIII, p. 2630. The Valiant
Encumbrances were defined as the REL, Pensco, and MF08 mortgages. Id.
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As noted in the course of proceedings section of this brief, VP moved for reconsideration
of the district comt's adoption of the Sykes legal descriptions. R. Vol. XXIV, pp. 2781-2798. The
district comt addressed this issue in its memorandum deciding VP's first motion for
reconsideration of the grant of summary judgment.

The district court concluded the legal

description provided by Valiant was sufficient, but not based upon what was submitted at summruy
judgment.
Rather, the district court relied upon the declaration of Schafer submitted in support of a
motion for entry of final judgment after the decision of the trial court granting the motion for
summary judgment utilizing the conve1ted legal description attached to the Sykes affidavit.
The district court emphasized no party had filed an opposition to the legal description
submitted by Valiant in support of its motion for entry of final judgment even though 28 days
elapsed between the filing the of the declru·ation and the hearing seeking entry of final judgment.
R Vol. XXIV, p. 2863. The district court justified its use of evidence submitted after the grant of
the summary judgment, holding:
Although Valiant's Motion for Entry of Final Judgment may not have been styled
as a "Motion for Summruy Judgment," it was effectively a motion for summary
judgment on the issue of the legal description, because it was filed 28 days prior to
the date fixed for hearing - consistent with Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) and was supp01ted by an affidavit (i.e., the Shafer Declaration) - consistent with
Idal10 Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e).
R Vol. XXIV, pp. 2868-2869.
The district court's holding misperceives the import of its previous summary judgment
ruling. Idaho Code § 45-1302 provides "[i]n any suit brought to foreclose a mortgage ... upon real
prope1ty. . . the court shall, in addition to granting relief in the foreclosure action, determine the
title, estate or interest of all pruties thereto in the same manner and to the same extent and effect
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as in the action to quiet title." The district court could not previously have granted summary
judgment to Valiant without a determination and identification of the foreclosed prope1iies.
Because the district comi had already dete1mined the identification of the foreclosed
prope1iy in its summary judgment decision, it had disposed of that issue. No issue regarding the
legal description of the foreclosed property remained for adjudication. Thus, a subsequent grant
of summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 on an issue already adjudicated was error. Failure to
comply with procedural rules is a question of law over which this Comi exercises free review.

Ernstv. Hemenway & Moser, Co., 120 Idaho 941,944,821 P.2d 996,999 (Ct. App. 1991).
It appears the trial comi acknowledged that VP's motion to reconsider regarding the legal
description had merit. Rather than reversing its ruling though, the district court devised a means
to affom its prior decision based on subsequent evidence submitted after the grant of summary
judgment. Nothing in I.R.C.P. 56 allowed such a procedure.
Fmiher, the procedure used by the disttict comt was unfair to VP. Rule 7 (b)( 1)(B) requires
that all motions "state with particularity the grounds for relief sought including the number of the
applicable civil rule, if any." Valiant' s motion for entry of final judgment did just that, citing to
Rule 54. Such a motion after receiving a complete grant of summary judgment on all issues was
not unforeseen.
What was unforeseen was the trial comt's conversion of the "Motion to Enter Final
Judgment" into a summary judgment on an issue it had already adjudicated merely because the
hearing occurred 28 days after the filing of the motion. In instances where a trial comt decides to
treat a submitted motion different from what was presented, when the substantial rights of the
opposing party are involved, the trial court is required to provide notice to the parties, so they can
appropriately respond.
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For instance, and by analogy, when a trial comt considers matters outside of the pleadings
on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, "the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in I.R.C.P. 56, and all patties shall be given a reasonable opportunity
to present all material made pe1tinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Hellickson v. Jenkins, 118
Idaho 273,276, 796 P.2d 150, 153 (Ct. App. 1990). The reason for the requirement is clear. It is
intended to allow the opposing party a fair opportunity to respond to the motion.
The same analysis extends to this issue. Although the hearing on the request to enter a
final judgment occun-ed 28 days after Valiant filed its motion for entry of judgment, there was no
notice provided to VP that the trial court had decided to deem the motion for entry judgment as a
motion for summary judgment on an issue it had already adjudicated. Therefore, VP had no fair
notice and opportunity to respond. The district comt erred when it treated the motion for entry of
final judgment as another motion for summary judgment on a previously adjudicated issue.
Fmther, subsequent proceedings revealed that the substituted legal description was not
sound. In a declai·ation filed by Shafer on August 19, 2015, Shafer admitted to mistakes in his
expe1t opinion. R Vol. XXVIII, pp. 3301-3328. Shafer originally testified all 186 lots were
equally encumbered by the REL mortgage, the Pensco moligage and the MF08 mortgage.
Following the district comt's rnling that the VP lots would be sold last because that was most
equitable, Shafer filed a declaration in suppmt of Valiant's motion to alter, amend and/or
reconsider the order of sale to of the real prope1ty (to sell VP's lots first) wherein Shafer claimed
his previous declai·ation was wrong. Shafer then testified that 31 of the lots which he previously
testified were encumbered by all three assigned mortgages were only encumbered by the REL
mmtgage, including a VP lot. Id.
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VP maintained in opposition to summary judgment that one of the foreclosed lots owned
by VP (Lot 2, Block 17 of the Replat of Golden Tee Estates and Golden Tee Estates 1st Addition
included as pati of the real pmperty described as "Parcel 4") was not covered by the Pensco and
MF08 mortgage based upon the face of the mortgages themselves. A review of the face of the
Pensco and MF08 mortgages supported this position.

Only Shafer's declarations supported

Valiant's claim it was encompassed in all three mortgages.
VP's summary judgment position proved to be true. Shafer later admitted he made e1mrs
in his initial expe1t opinion and provided contradictory testimony. This Court has indicated that
when a witness provides conflicting testimony that summary judgment is inappropriate. See

Capstar v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 283 P.3d 728 (2012) (holding when a witness's affidavit
testimony and deposition testimony are contradictory, it created an evidentiary conflict, and
summary judgment was inappropriate).

Besides being untimely, Shafer's own inconsistent

testimony created a question of fact regarding the legal description. VP was prejudiced by the
district comt' s utilization of Shafer's testimony in sustaining its prior grant of summary judgment.

4.

The district court erred in holding there was no genuine issue of
material fact regarding VP's prescriptive easement claims and
equitable servitude claims

Valiant' s request for summary judgment against VP was supp01ted by its conclusory claim
that a record search of Bonner County records indicated VP had no recorded interests in the
pmperty upon which it reg_uested foreclosure recorded prior to the assigned m01tgages it sought to
foreclose. Valiant presented no evidence that a record search had been conducted.

7

In fact, in a later motion brought by Valiant requesting a post-judgment temporary restraining order and postjudgment injunction against VP to prevent it frorn discontinuing utility services to the foreclosed lots, Valiant
introduced plats recorded prior to the REL mortgage in Bonner County, which showed a plat recorded December 5,
2000 (R Vol. LXXVIII, p. 9807) and several other plats recorded October 6, 2006 which contained a water service
note identifying VP as the water and sewer purveyor as initially testified to by Villelli (R Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 98089812).
7

34

As set forth in the Statement of Facts, it was undisputed at summary judgment that the PSA
between NIR and POBD's predecessor specifically excluded "domestic water rights which were
retained by sewer and water company V.P. Inc. including easements for operation and delivery of
said domestic water and sewer service including sewer lagoon and land application." R Vol. XXI,
p. 23 99. There was no dispute that the water and sewer systems were going concerns that was
serving other real properties at the time POBD's predecessor acquired title to the Idaho Club,
including part of the project property and a community known as Hidden Lakes. It was undisputed
that much of the system had been in place for over 20 years at the time of execution of the PSA.
There was no dispute the PSA required VP to provide capacity to the Idaho Club project.
It was undisputed that the PSA required VP to operate the water and sewer system within the Idaho
Club development. There was no dispute VP did so, and had a water and sewer service agreement
with each individual parcel that received water and sewer service.
There was no dispute the PSA required POBD cooperate with POBD's predecessor in
gaining development approval with Bonner County. It was undisputed that VP provided Bonner
County a "will serve" letter committing VP to serve water and sewer to the Idaho Club to gain
approval from Bonner County for the Idaho Club project in connection with plat approval requests.
No dispute existed that VP reviewed the proposed plats when issuing the will serve letters, and
each of those proposed plats included a "Water and Sewer Service Note" on the face of the
proposed plat that indicated all lots shown on the plat would receive water and sewer service from
VP, Inc. 's systems and recitations to its public water system license number. There is no dispute
the proposed plats also contained a lienholder's certificate where REL agreed to the proposed plat.
There was no dispute that VP subsequently entered into a Construction and Operation
Agreement whereby POBD was allowed to extend VP's water and sewer system to serve the Idaho

35

Club, and VP accepted the responsibility for operation. It was undisputed that VP operated the
water and sewer systems as agreed. No dispute existed that it was agreed that VP owned the
infrastructure extensions of its water and sewer systems, and POBD was to grant VP easements
for its placement of extensions within the project.

There was no dispute that VP was the

Responsible Official on the sewer effluent treatment pe1mit.
It was undisputed that DEQ took enforcement action related to the Idaho Club
development. There was no dispute as a result of that enforcement action that POBD was required
to deed four lots that contained water and sewer infrastructure to VP, as opposed to granting
easements.
The district comt deemed the above facts insufficient to establish a genuine issue of
material fact adequate to preclude summary judgment against VP's claims that it had senior
prescriptive easements and equitable servitudes not subject to foreclosure. The district court
specifically held Villelli's testimony that much ofVP's utility infrastructure had been in place for
over 20 years at the time NIR entered into the PSA was "a conclusory statement that [was]
unsupp01ted by evidence." R. Vol. XXXIII, p. 4013. The district court also concluded that because
VP was not a party to the PSA, it "does not create any legal rights in VP and does not create a
genuine issue of fact as to VP's prescriptive easements/equitable servitude claims." R Vol.
XXXIII, p. 4013.
InFragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,281 P.3d 103, 108 (2012), this Comtheld:
The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in
support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold matter
to be addressed before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences
rule to determine whether the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007)
(citing Carnell v. Barker Mgmt., Inc., 137 Idaho 322,327, 48 P.3d 651,656 (2002)).
"This Comt applies an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's
determination of the admissibility of testimony offered in connection with a motion
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for summary judgment. 11 Id. at 15, 17 5 P .3d at 177 (citing McDaniel v. Inland
Northwest Renal Care Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219,221, 159 P.3d 856, 858
(2007)). 11 A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the
issue as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the
c01Tect legal standards, and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason."
O'Connor v. Harger Const,-., Inc., 145 Idaho 904, 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008)
(citing West Woodinvs., Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106P.3d401, 408 (2005)).

The 2015 version of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) required that opposing affidavits
must be made on personal knowledge, and set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence,
and affirmatively show that the affiant was competent to testify to the matters stated in the
affidavit. This requirement is not satisfied by an affidavit that is conclusory, based on hearsay and
not suppmied by personal knowledge. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership, 127 Idaho 67,
271, 899 P.2d 977,981 (1995).
The requirement of undel'lying evidence to support a finding that the witness has personal
knowledge is often refened to as "foundation." Foundation is defined as "evidence or testimony
that establishes the admissibility of other evidence." Black's Law Dictionary 727 (Bryan A.
Gardner ed., 9th ed., West 2009).
Villelli's affidavit presented proper foundation for the testimony that much ofVP's water
and sewer infrastructure had been in place 20 years at the time POBD's predecessor purchase from
NIR in 2005. Villelli was the president of VP and had personal knowledge of its systems and
operations. VP owned and operated the water and sewer systems since VP purchased the water
and sewer systems in 1995. Villelli had personal knowledge regarding ownership and operation
of the water and sewer systems. Villelli' s testimony was not conclusory and was supported by
proper foundation.
However, even if the statement that the infrastructure had been in place 20 years was
deemed conclusory, there ce1iainly was adequate foundation from which the trial comt should
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have concluded that Villelli had personal knowledge to testify that VP's water and sewer
infrastructure had been in place for 10 years at the time of the PSA. Thus, the trial comi abused
its discretion in rejecting Villelli's testimony.
The district comi's other basis for rejecting Villelli's testimony also constituted reversible
error. The district court held since VP was not a patty to the PSA, the PSA did not create any legal
rights in VP, and therefore there could be no genuine issue of fact as to VP's easements and
servitude claims. The district comi abused its discretion when it rejected Villelli's testimony on
this basis.
The trial court appears to have ruled that VP was· not a third-party beneficiary to the PSA,
and therefore it could not enforce the PSA. This is a legal determination rather than a ruling upon
admissibility of evidence. VP did not seek to enforce the terms of the PSA. Instead, the PSA was
introduced as foundation and corroboration for Villelli's testimony that VP and POBD's
predecessor reached ce1iain agreements regai·ding extension and ownership ofVP's infrastructure
within the Idaho Club project, and to establish that POBD was transferred no rights in the existing
water and sewer systems at the time the PSA was executed.
VP set f01ih sufficient facts that the infrastructure that existed at the time the PSA was
executed, including the wastewater lagoon, was not sold to POBD's predecessor. Since it was not
sold to POBD's predecessor, POBD could not have mortgaged it. Thus, it was error to grant
summary judgment to Valiant that it had a superior right to any of VP' s infrastructure existing at
the time of the sale.
Further, VP claimed it had prescriptive easements for the existing infrastructure which lay
within the land purchased by POBD's successor. As established by the PSA, VP did not own the
real property sold to POBD's successor. Also within the PSA was information which indicated
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VP had infrastructure within the property sold to POBD's predecessor. Even ifVillelli's testimony
that the infrastructure was in place since 1985 were discounted for lack of foundation, the evidence
that it was in place when VP purchased the systems in 1995 until the date of the execution of the
PSA does not lack foundation. At the time of the 2006 sale to POBD's predecessor, the existing
infrastructure had been in place for at least a ten-year period. This period was sufficient to raise
an issue of fact whether VP was entitled to a prescriptive easement for the existing infrastructure. 8
Besides its claim to a superior interest in the existing infrastructure, VP claimed it had
equitable servitudes for its existing infrastructure and the infrastructure which POBD extended
within the Idaho Club project, and there was a question of fact whether Valiant took subject to
those equitable servitudes.

The undisputed facts submitted by VP in opposition to summary

judgment were akin to those inMiddlekaiiffv. Lake Cascade, Inc., 103 Idaho 832,654 P.2d 1385
(1982) (MiddlekaiiffI) and Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 110 Idaho 909, 913, 719 P .2d 1169,
1173 (1986) (Middlekauff II).
In those cases, Plaintiffs were owners of real property located in the Lake Cascade area.
Plaintiffs purchased property from Lake Cascade, Inc. ("LCI"), a wholly owned subsidiary
corporation of Bric of America, Inc. ("BA"). Middlekauff II, 110 Idaho at 911, 719 P .2d at 1171.
When plaintiffs purchased the land from LCI it "orally represented that the property adjacent to
their newly pUl'chased property would be used and would remain as a common area for a boat
basin, landing strip and other recreational activities." Id. The prope1ty and facilities were used as
such until 1977. Id

8 "In 2006, Idaho Code section 5-203 was amended to extend the statutory time period from five years to twenty
years. However, the twenty-year time period does not apply to an easement by prescription acquired prior to the
amendment. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411,283 p.3d 728, footnote 2 (2012).
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BA and LCI subsequently filed for Chapter XI bankruptcy and sold some of the propeity
to third party buyers. Id. Plaintiffs "filed suit in district court alleging that the parcel of land in
question had not been kept as a common area as represented and requested that the court enter its
judgment declaring that the real property be utilized exclusively for the common use purposes that
were enumerated in the complaint." Id. at 912, 719 P .2d at 1172.
In Middlekauff I, this Court held that the alleged promise that the parcel of land would
remain a common area was "neither a lien nor an encumbrance" and, on remand, the district court
determined (1) the plaintiffs had an enforceable property interest against LCI, and (2) that interest
was enforceable against the third-party buyers because those buyers took the property with notice
of the oral representation, preventing the third-party buyers from being bona fide purchasers. Id
at 913, 719 P.2d at 1173.
In Middlekauff II, LCI and BA argued the oral representations ofLCI and its agents could
not create an enforceable interest in the common area. Id. This Court, citing to the New Mexico
case of Ute Park Summer Homes Ass 'n v. Maxwell Land Grant Co., 83 N.M. 558, 494 P.2d 971
(1972), rejected the argument stating, "the plat is not the only means by which a right can be
created" and "oral representations could do so as well." MiddlekauffII, 110 Idaho at 913, 719 P .2d
at 1173. "Obviously, to create such rights in the mentioned fashion does not require an instrument
in writing signed by the party to be charged." Id (quoting Ute Park II, 494 P.2d at 973). "Ute Park
stands for the proposition that under certain circumstances a writing is not required to establish a
legally enforceable interest and any number of factors, if found by the trial court to be sufficient,
may justify a finding that the plaintiffs have an interest in the land." Id. at 914, 719 P.2d at 1174.
In West Wood Invs. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 83, 106 P.3d 401, 409 (2005), decided after

Middlekauff I and Middlekauff II, this Court held:
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"Equitable servitudes are distinguished from covenants running with the land
in that the latter should be of record, and a buyer takes with constructive knowledge,
if not actual knowledge, of the existence of such recorded covenants and is thereby
bound to the covenants."
In other wmds, equitable servitudes do not have the same writing or recording requirements
as restrictive covenants. As this Court in West Wood explained:
The question [of enforceability] does not depend on whether the covenant runs with
the land ... if there was a mere agreement and no covenant [running with the
land], this court would enforce it against the party purchasing with notice of
it; for if an equity is attached to the property by the owner, no one purchasing with
notice of that equity can stand in a different situation from the party from who (sic)
he purchased. 898 P.2d at 379-80 (quoting Tulk v. lvloxhay (1948), 2 Ph. 774 (41
Eng. Rep. 1143)) (emphasis added in quotation). Equitable interests may arise
because of the actions of the parties, such as oral representations. Middlekauff v.
Lake Cascade, Inc., 110 Idaho 909, 913, 719 P.2d 1169, 1173 (1986) (Middlekauff
JI). In Middlekauff v. Lake Cascade, Inc., 103 Idaho 832, 654 P.2d 1385 (1982)
(Middlekauff I), this court established the test relevant to detennining if a promise
regarding the use of land runs against a successor in interest of the original
promiser: 1) whether or not the party claiming the enforceable interest actually has
an interest against the miginal promisor; and 2) if such right exists, whether it is
enforceable against the subsequent purchaser. Middlekaeff I, 103 Idaho at 834-35,
654 P.2d at 1387-88.

Id. at 83-84 (emphasis in original).
Equitable servitudes do not require horizontal privity between the parties for the servitude
to be enforceable against successors in interest. St. Clair v. Krueger, 115 Idaho 702, 705 n.1, 769
P.2d 579,582 (1989).
Thus, to survive summaiy judgment, VP had the burden of showing there was a material
question of fact whether VP had an interest against POBD in the areas where its infrastructure was
installed within the foreclosed lots in the Idaho Club, and whether that interest was enforceable
against the REL mortgage, the Pensco mortgage and the MF08 mo1igage. The facts submitted in
the statement of facts above were sufficient to create a genuine issue material issue of fact with
regai·d to both elements, thus precluding the grant of summatT judgment.
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Regarding the first element, VP was required to introduce evidence VP had an interest in
the locations within the Idaho Club where its infrastrnctme was located. As in Middlekmiff I and

Middlekauff II, VP submitted undisputed evidence that POBD's predecessor, and POBD itself,
promised if VP would allow it to extend VP's water and sewer infrastructure throughout the Idaho
Club project, and operate the water and sewer systems within the project, that POBD would
subsequently grant VP easements upon completion of the project.
Turning to the second element, VP was required to introduce evidence from which the
district court could reasonably draw the inference that REL, Pensco Trust fbo Barney Ng and
MF08 had notice of VP's interest in the real property. As noted in the statement of facts,
undisputed evidence was submitted that Barney Ng, who was managed the loans for REL, Pensco
Trnst and MF08, requested and was provided the final third amended and restated PSA, as well as
the second version of the PSA, prior to granting the REL mortgage (which was also prior to the
subsequent Pensco and MF08 mortgages). It was also undisputed that REL signed off on the
proposed plats, each of which included the provisions that VP would be the supplier of water and
sewer services for the platted areas.
VP presented sufficient evidence as set f01ih in the statement of facts for the dish·ict collli
to reasonably draw the inference that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the first
and second elements necessary for imposition of an equitable servitude with respect to the water
and sewer systems.
Finally, since REL, Pensco and MF08 had notice of the agreement, the last step is to
determine if their notice is attributable to Valiant. Valiant was assigned REL, Pensco and MF08
the promissory notes and mortgages which are the foundation of its foreclosme. An assignee
generally acquires no greater right than was possessed by the assignor, and is subject to all defenses
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and claims that the debtor had against the assignor. JBM, LLC v. Cintorino, 159 Idaho 772, 776,
367 P.3d 167 (2016).

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE RIGHTS AND
RELATIONSHIPS OF FUTURE PURCHASERS FOLLOWING
FORECLOSURE WITHOUT A PENDING CASE OR CONTROVERSY
1.

Statement of Facts

The district court's judgment included no decree regarding the rights of future purchasers
following the sheriff's sale. R Vol. XLV, pp. 5413-5502. However, the district court's decree of
foreclosure at section C(2)(aa) provided with respect to Valiant's assigned mortgages only, should
POBD or its successors or assigns be in possession or occupy any pmiion of the Idaho Club
Prope1iy or improvements thereon at the time of the foreclosure sale, and should the occupant fail
to deliver possession of the parcel to Valiant, the occupant would immediately become the tenant
of the purchaser at such sale, which tenancy would be a tenancy from day-to-day, tenninable at
the will of the landlord, and at a rental per day based upon the value of the parcel and improvement,
such rental to be due daily to the purchaser at foreclosure. R Vol. XLIV, p. 5329.
Valiant purchased several parcels of property at the sheriff's sale, including those identified
as Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 which contained a pmtion ofVP's water and sewe1· system infrastructure.
R Vol. LXII, pp. 7747-7766, 7750-7794. On December 9, 2016, Valiant's counsel sent a letter
notifying VP's counsel Valiant had purchased Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, presenting the sheriff's
ce1tificates of sale, informing VP that a rental fee of $866.09 per diem was accruing until VP
delivered the parcels to Valiant, and requesting access for inspection to any improvements
constrncted on the parcel. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9342-9343. On December 30, 2016, Valiant sent
VP's counsel a Notice of Eviction and a demand for past due rent and disgorgement of any
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hookup/tap fees and all amounts VP had collected for providing sanitary sewer and water services
since November 7, 2016. R Vol. LXXV, p. 9344. VP did not meet Valiant's demands. Id.
On February 8, 2017, Valiant filed a motion to enforce the district court's judgment under
IAR 13(b)(10) and 13(b)(13), together with a supporting memorandum and declaration of counsel,
seeking to evict VP from those lots identified at the Sheriffs sale as Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 for
failure to pay it rent as required by the decree of foreclosure. R Vol. LXVII, p. 8268- Vol. LXX,
p. 8708. The district court observed that clause [C(2)] y required anyone in possession after the
foreclosure sale to surrender possession of the parcel upon production of the certificate of sale or
a duly authenticated copy of it. R Vol. LXXV, p. 9346.
The district court held Valiant was properly seeking a writ of assistance as the purchaser
at foreclosure directing the Sheriff to eject and remove VP from using, holding or detaining the
prope1ty. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9348-93949. The district court concluded it had the discretionary
power to issue such a writ. Id.

2.

The district court erred in declaring the rights of future purchasers
without an existing case or controversy before it

Before addressing the propriety of the district comt's issuance of a writ of assistance, the
fundamental issue must be addressed whether the district comt erred as a matter of law in
adjudicating the rights of future purchasers following foreclosure. Pursuant to I.C. § 45-1302, the
district comt had the power to foreclose the m01tgages, and to determine the title, estate or interest
of all parties named in the suit. The district court did not have the power pursuant to this statute
to declare the future rights of the unknown purchasers following foreclosure. In so doing, the
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district comt issued a declaratory judgment of the rights of parties not before it, and violated the
requirement that it make no determination unless it had before it an actual case or controversy, 9
To dete1mine a case, a court must have before it a justiciable controversy. In Davidson v.
Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 151 P.3d 812, (2006), this Coutt held:

A prerequisite to a declaratory judgment action is an actual or justiciable
controversy. 11 Weldon v. Bonner County Tax Coalition, 124 Idaho 31, 36, 855 P.2d
868, 873 (1993). The doctrine of justiciability can be divided into several
subcategories, including that of standing and ripeness. Id. Ripeness is that pait of
justiciability that 11 asks whether there is any need for comt action at the present
time. 11 Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 317, 92 P .3d 1063, 1064 (2002). This
Comt has described a justiciable controversy as one that is distinguished from a
difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is
academic or moot.. .. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the
legal relations of the parties having adverse legal interests .... It must be a real and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive
chmacter, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts. Weldon, 124 Idaho at 36, 855 P.2d at 873 (quoting
Harris v. Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,516,681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984)).
11

At the time the district court entered its decree, there were no future purchasers before it,
and the identification of any such person was speculative. There was also no actual controversy
between the unknown future pmchasers and any potential holdover tenant. Thus, the matter was
not ripe for the decree entered by the trial comt regarding the rights and relationships of future
purchasers, and the comt exceeded its authority in its decree of foreclosure.
This limitation on the district comt is even recognized in other statutes relative to
foreclosure. Idaho Code section 6-407 empowers a comt during the foreclosure of a m01tgage to
issue an injunction to restrain a pmty in possession from doing certain acts that injure the prope1ty,
or to issue an injunction after an execution sale but before a conveyance. After the conveyance to
the foreclosure purchaser, this statute recognizes the power of the comt ceases. The trial comt

In fact, the only reason Valiant was able to bring its motion for enforcement as a future purchaser was because it
was ah'eady a party to the foreclosure. Had any other person purchased, they would not even have been a party to
the suit.

·9
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e1red as a matter oflaw when it included provisions in its decree of foreclosure that addressed the
potential rights and remedies of future purchasers following the foreclosure sale.

D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING AGAINST VP
A POST-JUDGMENT TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
FOLLOWED BY AN INJUNCTION

1.

Statement of Facts

As set forth in the Course of Proceedings, on February 8, 2017, Valiant filed a motion to
enforce the district comi'sjudgment under I.AR. 13(6)(10) and I.AR. 13(6)(13), together with a
suppmiing memorandum and declaration of counsel, seeking to evict VP from those lots identified
at the Sheriff's sale as Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 for failure to pay it rent as required by the decree of
foreclosure. R Vol. LXVII, p. 8268- Vol. LXX, p. 8708. Thereafter, on March 6, 2017, the district
comi issued its memorandum decision and order. 1n the conclusion and order section of the
decision, the district court held:
.. .IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1.
Valiant is entitled to the immediate possession of all 154 parcels of the
Idaho Club Prope1iy purchase by Valiant at the Sheriff's Sale. VP is ordered to
immediately vacate any and every part of all 154 parcels. A writ of assistance
shall be entered in accordance with this Memorandum Decision.... (emphasis
added).
R Vol. LXXV, p. 9358
In its Memorandum Decision and Order the district court also awarded damages against
VP for daily rent in an amount to be dete1mined for its occupation after foreclosure for Parcel 1
and Parcel 2 from the date of sale until Valiant entered into possession of both parcels. R Vol.
LXXV, p. 9358.
Immediately upon receipt of the above decision and order, on March 7, 2017, VP filed a
motion for an order allowing it continued access and use of Parcels 1 and 2 of the judgment so VP
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could maintain the water and sewer services to its customers, including those within the Idaho
Club project (which included any of the 154 foreclosed lots which had residences upon them), and
an application pursuant to I.AR. 13 for stay of the enforcement of the writ of assistance pending
appeal. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9388- 9398.
To avoid any delay on the ruling, VP did not request oral argument. Id Twenty-one days
later, on March 27, 2017, the district court issued an Order Requesting Response Brief from
Valiant Idaho, LLC with respect to the motion for the stay. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9413-414. On
March 28, 2017, Valiant noticed for hearing VP's motion for the order allowing VP the use and
access to Parcels 1 and 2, and a stay on appeal. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9415-9417. Valiant also
requested an extension to respond to VP' s motion for an order allowing use and access to Parcels
1 and 2, and application for stay of enforcement of the judgment. R Vol. LXXV, pp. 9418-9420.
On March 28, 2017, the district court granted Valiant's motion for an extension to respond to VP's
motion. R Vol. LXXV, p. 9421-9423.
On April 11, 2017, Valiant filed its memorandum in opposition to VP' s motion for access
to Parcels 1 and 2, and stay of enforcement of the judgment contending:
VP's Stay Motion seeks an order from this Court allowing it to continue accessing
and using properties and infrastructure now owned by Valiant, and staying
enforcement of the Writ of Assistance entered by this Comt on March 6, 2017
("Writ of Assistance) until after the appeal to the Idaho Supreme Comt has
concluded. The Stay Motion is without any basis in fact or law, and it attempts to
circumvent the codified means of staying enforcement of judgments and obtaining
preliminary injunctions. As such, the Stay Motion should be denied.
R Vol. LXXVII, p. 9666. Later in the same memorandum, Valiant claimed it had not ejected VP
from Parcel 2 or the associated Water System Infrastructure but reserved its right to do so at a later
date. R Vol. LXXVII, p. 9668. This position was completely contrary to the order of ejectment it
sought and obtained from the district court discussed above, and the subsequent writ of assistance
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it presented to the district comt, and which was issued by the district comt, whereby the sheriff
was directed to "[e]ject and remove each and every person or entity, including but not limited to
VP, from using, holding or detain the Valiant Parcels and all fixtures, appmtenances and
improvements associated therewith, without delay, including Parcel 1, Parcel 2 and the
Sewer/Water System, or any part thereof... ". LXXVII, pp. 9637.

On April 28, 2017, the district comt entered its Order Granting Injunction against VP
prohibiting compliance with the above order. R Vol. LXXIX, pp. 9871-9878. The Comt found
that VP's wells were necessary for the operation of the Idaho Club's water system. Id. at p. 9873.
VP was ordered to continue providing water service to the Idaho Club, including the foreclosed
lots until such time as Valiant drilled its own groundwater wells and constructed necessary
infrastructme to isolate the 154 lots it acquired at foreclosure. R Vol. LXXIX, p. 9874-9875. VP
was ordered to continue operation of its sewer system serving those lots outside the 154 foreclosed
lots, even if it involved use of infrastructure on the 154 foreclosed lots, until such time as it could
isolate its sewer system from the foreclosed lots (if that is even possible). Valiant was granted the
right to operate the sewer system within the foreclosed lots. Id. Additionally, the district cmut
ordered that Valiant was entitled to collect all sewer fees owed VP pursuant to VP's customer
service agreements, including customers who were served by the sewer system outside the
foreclosed lots. Id.
2.

The district court erred in issuing a post-judgment temporary
restraining order against VP followed by an injunction

In compliance with the Cami's order requiring VP to vacate its use of the infrastructure
within the 154 foreclosed lots, VP ceased its use of the water infrastructure within the 154
foreclosed lots which caused a pottion of the Idaho Club to no longer have water service, including
Valiant. VP's compliance introduced an ironic twist to the litigation.
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Valiant immediately filed a motion for issuance of a post-judgment temporary restraining
order and post-judgment preliminary injunction against VP pursuant to Rule 65, I.R.C.P. R Vol.
LXXVII, pp. 9683-9685. Despite its position in the motion to eject VP from the foreclosed lots,
Valiant now claimed the trial court should issue a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction" ... requiring VP to restore water services and prohibiting VP from thereafter interfering
with or te1minating water service to the owners and residents of the properties located within The
Idaho Club development project, including Valiant, until such time as Valiant begins providing

water service for The Idaho Club." R Vol. LXXVII, p. 9684. Valiant claimed it would suffer
irrepar~ble hmm because its real property would no longer have any protection against a fire
hazard; raw sewage might back-up into any structures constructed on Valiant's property; without
water to maintain it, the real prope1ty value would likely be diminished; and, Valiant would be
unable to further develop, mm·ket or sell its real property. Id.
Valiant claimed "VP's illegal conduct" of complying with the district comt's decree of
foreclosure and subsequent enforcement order was causing immediate and in·eparable harm to
Valiant. R LXXVII, p. 9690. To supp01t its request for as temporary restraining order and
prelirninm·y injunction, Valiant relied upon the following facts:
•

VP owned the source wells that provided water and fire protection services to all lots and
homes within the development (R Vol. LXXVII, p. 9688);

•

An affidavit of a prope1ty owner indicating he received notice on March 30, 2017, from
VP notifying him compliance with the Court's order would result in termination of his
water service, and that the water service was actually terminated April l2, 2017 (R Vol.
LXXVII, pp. 9699-9700);
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•

A declaration by William Habe1man, the Manager of Valiant, that VP unilaterally and
without notice to Valiant shut-off water services to much of the l'eal property located within
the Idaho Club, including to the Valiant lots, which prevented Valiant from talcing further
steps to develop, market and sell the Valiant Lots (R Vol. LXXVII, p. 9704, ,i,r 4-5);

•

VP had no service contracts with Valiant, but VP had permit obligations pursuant to
pe1mits issued by DEQ and plats duly recorded with the Bonner County Recorder's Office
to provide water services to the Idaho Club (R Vol. LXXVIII, p. 9795);

•

Idaho Code§§ 50-1326 through 50-1329 places sanitary restrictions upon every residential
subdivision plat prohibiting construction of any building until the developer complied with
the act (R Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 9795-9796);

•

Before the plats comprising the Idaho Club could be recorded, the developer was required
to certify that all lots in the plat would be eligible to receive water service from an existing
water system, and the existing water distribution system had agreed in writing to serve all
the lots in the subdivision (R Vol. LXXVIII, pp. 9795-9756);

•

VP provided a "will serve" l~tter to the Idaho Club developer (R Vol. LXXVIII, p. 9796);

•

VP reviewed the planned unit development application to Bonner County which stated,
"VP is the water and sewer provider and "will serve" the property as it is developed" (R
Vol. LXXVIII, p. 9796-9797);

•

VP reviewed the preliminary plat applications which included identical language (R Vol.
LXXVIII, p. 9797);

•

VP entered in a Consti·uction and Operating Agreement with POBD in June 2006 whereby
VP agreed to provide water [and sewerJ services to the Idaho Club, which included fire
protection services (R Vol. LXXVIII, p. 9797);
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•

All of the plats comprising the Idaho Club (Golden Tee Phase One, Golden Tee Phase Two,
Golden Tee - 2nd Addition, Golden Tee - 3rd Addition, Golden Tee - 4 th Addition, Golden
Tee- 5th Addition, Golden Tee - 6th Addition, Golden Tee - 7th Addition, and Golden Tee
- 8th Addition) included a "Water and Sewer Service Note'' advising that "all Lots shown
on the Plat will receive water and sewer service from VP, Inc. (PWS No. 1090195) (R Vol.
LXXVIII, p. 9797; pp. 9802-9814);

•

Each of the lenders relied upon this representation in agreeing to loan monies to POBD for
construction of the development (R Vol. LXXVIII, p. 9797); and

•

Individuals who purchased lots in the Idaho Club relied upon the representation that VP
would provide water and sewer services (R Vol. LXXVIII, p. 9798).
If these facts sound familiar, they should. Most of them are the exact same facts submitted

by VP in opposition to Valiant's motion for summary judgment on VP's easement and equitable
servitude claims.
Despite receiving a decree from the court that VP's easement and equitable servitude
claims were eliminated, and VP had no fu1ther right to utilize them to deliver water and sewer
service, Valiant took a contrary position in seeking a post-judgment temporary restraining order
and preliminary injunction. Valiant argued this same evidence justified issuance of a postjudgment "preliminary injunction" from the district comt requiring VP to continue to utilize its
infrastructure to provide water service, but only until Valiant could drill wells to provide an
alternative source of water to its 154 foreclosed lots.
The inconsistency of Valiant' s position highlights the district court's enor at summary
judgment. If the same facts presented in the post-tdal motion justified issuance of a temporary
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restraining order and injunction, they certainly were sufficient to prevent entry of summary
judgment on VP's prescriptive easement and equitable servitude claims.
The district court's injunction order indicated, "Valiant's Motion for Preliminary
Injunction is GRANTED in accordance with the Order Granting Injunction herein. Id. Yet, rather
than Rule 65, the district court recited to I.A.R. 13(b)(l0) and 13(b)(13) as the basis for the
injunction.
In determining the scope of the stay allowed by 1.A.R. 13, the orders that are stayed must
be identified. The district court issued a judgment which eliminated VP's interest in its easements
and its equitable servitudes. It subsequently entered an order requiring VP to stop using its
infrastructure within the 154 foreclosed lots, including Parcel 2, followed by a writ of assistance
ejecting VP from the 154 foreclosed lots.
Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(10) allowed the district court to make any order pending appeal
regarding the use, preservation or possession of any property during the appeal which was the
subject of the action. Idaho Appellate Rule 13(b)(13) allowed the district court to take any action
or enter any order required for the enforcement of any judgment or order already entered in the
matter.
Although the district court identified I.A.R. 13(b)(13) as one of the rnles upon which it
relied, its injunction order contains no provision regarding the enforcement of its judgment or
order. It did the opposite. The district court partially stayed its previous order ejecting VP from
the foreclosed lots.
Pursuant to 1.A.R. 13(b)(10), the district cmut had the power to allow VP the use and
possession of Parcel 2 and the related water infrastrncture within the 154 parcels during the
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pendency of the appeal. The effect of the district court's order allowed such use, which was proper
under I.AR. 13(b)(10).
However, the district court's injunction then exceeded the scope of I.AR. 13(b)(l0). It
ordered VP provide Valiant water service without any contractual basis to do so. Valiant had no
customer service agreement with VP. It also required such service to continue until Valiant drilled
its own wells, which time frame was not tied to the pendency of the appeal. Neither of these
provisions of the district comt's injunction were proper under I.AR. 13(b)(l0) because these
requirements were um-elated to the use, preservation or possession of prope1ty which was the
subject of the action during the pendency of the appeal.
Similarly, the district comt did not have the power to order that Valiant could collect all
sewer fees owed VP pursuant to its customer service contracts. This requirement was um-elated to
the use or possession of the prope1ty during the pendency of the appeal.
It is clear the district comt was struggling to fashion an equitable and practical solution to

a problem created when the district court granted foreclosure of VP's easements and equitable_
servitudes within the foreclosed lots and ordered VP to cease using its infrastructure to supply
water and sewer services. However, the district court exceeded its authority when it did so.

E.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF COSTS AGAINST VP WAS AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION

Another appeal is pending before this Court in the case of Valiant Idaho, LLC vs. North

Idaho Resorts, LLC, Docket No. 44583, which fully addresses this issue. Due to page imitations
on the opening brief in this appeal, VP hereby joins in North Idaho Resorts, LLC's opening brief
as though set forth in full herein. However, to comply with the requirement that this brief contain
authority and legal argument, VP makes the following summary of the argument in which it joins.
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) allows the trial court to award a prevailing party costs
of an action. 10 The rules of civil procedure categorize costs in two groups: costs as a matter of
right, and discretionary costs. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) and (D).

Costs as a matter of right are

specifically enumerated and limited to those enumerated. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C). Discretionary costs
are those "[a]dditional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of [costs as a
matter of right]." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). Discretionary costs "may be allowed on a showing that
the costs were necessary and exceptional costs, reasonably incuned, and should in the interest of
justice be assessed against the adverse paiiy." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) (emphasis added). "The burden
is on the prevailing pruiy to make an adequate initial showing that these costs were necessary and
exceptional and reasonably incmTed, and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the
adverse party." Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 965, 971 (1993);

Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918,926, 821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991); Fuller v. Wolters, 119
Idaho 415,425, 807 P.2d 633,643 (1991). Only after the prevailing party successfully meets its
burden, the trial court "must make express findings as to why the item of discretionary cost should
or should not be allowed," after an objection by an opposing party. I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D).
A review of the trial court's memorandum decision and order awru·ding discretionru·y costs
against VP reveals that the award was an abuse of discretion.
1.

The District Court did not Perceive its Award of Discretionary Costs
as a Matter of Discretion

The district court's decision never affirmed or mentioned that it was exercising its
discretion in awarding Valiant discretionaI"y costs. Indeed, the district court's only use of the
term "discretionary" was in the context of the term "discretionary costs" as used in I.R.C.P.

!O

Appellant NIR makes no challenge on appeal to the dish·ict comt's prevailing paity detennination.
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54(d)(l)(D). R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5838-5842. Thus, the district cmut failed to perceive the issue
as one of discretion.

2.

The District Court did not Act within the Boundaries of its Discretion
or Consistent with Applicable Legal Standards

Rule 54(d)(l)(D) limits the court's ability to award discretionary costs to instances where
the movant or requesting paity makes a "showing that the costs were necessary and exceptional
costs, reasonably incuned, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse
party." I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D). The district comt did not act within the boundaries ofits discretion
when it awarded Valiant discretionary costs despite its failure to make a showing that the costs
were exceptional and should in the interest of justice be assessed against VP. In fact, these factors
were not assessed by the district court, which awarded costs merely because they were incurred,
as demonstrated from the district court's decision, wherein it held:
The Comt finds that the scope and complexity of this litigation resulted in necessary
and exceptional costs which Valiant should be awarded in the interests of justice,
because these are costs which Valiant had to expend to fully litigate this matter
but which are not contemplated by the Idaho Rules of Civil procedure as a
matter of right.''
R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5839-40. (Emphasis added.)
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(l)(D) does not define what it means for a cost to be
"exceptional." This Comt has held the trial comt "may evaluate whether costs are exceptional
within the context of the nature of the case." Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347,354,256 P.3d
755, 762 (2011). Idaho case law has developed a consistent definition of an exceptional cost: An
exceptional cost is one that is uncommon in the particular type of case, or that arises from a case
that itself is exceptional. The second standard, or the "exceptional case standard," was set fmth in
Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist; v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307,314, 109 P.3d 161,168 (2005), as follows:
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"This Court has always construed the requirement that a cost be 'exceptional' under l.R.C.P.
54(d)(l)(D) to include those costs incurred because the nature of the case was itself exceptional."
Costs consistent with the type of case being litigated are not exceptional. This Comi has
held "[c]e1iain cases, such as personal injury, [sic] cases generally involve copy, travel and expert
witness fees such that these costs are considered ordinary rather than "exceptional" under LR. C.P.
54(d)(l)(D)." Hayden Lake Fire Prat. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P.3d 161, 168
(2005). See also Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 493-94, 960 P.2d 175, 176-77 (1998) (holding
expert witnesses in personal injury cases were not exception and were common); Inama v. Brewer,
132 Idaho 377, 384, 973 P.2d 148, 155 (1999), (holding costs of a common nature to the type of
case being litigated were not exceptional); Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 354--55, 256
P.3d 755, 762-63 (2011) (holding expe1i medical testimony is common in a malpractice case).
According to Idaho's case law on the issue, if an expense is ordinary and common to the
type of action before the trial court, it is an abuse of discretion to make a discretionary cost award
for that cost. Thus, the inquiry is whether the discretionary costs requested by Valiant were
exceptional costs.

3.

Valiant Failed to Carry its Burden to Show Exceptional Costs and
Justice in Awarding Those Costs Against VP

In this case, there was no evidence presented to the district comi that any of the
discretionary costs requested by Valiant were exceptional or uncommon in a commercial
foreclosure action of this magnitude. Valiant also failed to address why justice would require the
discretionaiy costs be taxed against VP as opposed to any of the other pmiies to the action, such
as POBD. Initially Valiant simply concluded its requested discretionary costs were necessary and
exceptional without providing any reason why the costs were "exceptional." R Vol. XLI, pp. 5052
- 5055.
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In reply to VP's objection to Valiant's requested discretionary costs, Valiant admitted that
the only reason it believed the discretionary costs it requested were exceptional was because it
believed VP acted frivolously throughout the action, making the action itself exceptional:
As discussed, NIR and VP's defense of this lawsuit was frivolous. As such, all of
the discretionary costs for which Valiant seeks recovery in the Valiant foreclosure
action (other than the litigation guarantee) should be deemed exceptional. It is the
exceptional case in which a party acts frivolously. Therefore, once the Comt finds
that NIR and VP defended this case frivolously, it follows that all the costs incmred
because of those frivolous defenses are exceptional and recoverable as
discretionary costs.
R Vol. XLVII, p. 5767. The trial comt rejected Valiant's argument that NIR, VP and N had
defended their positions frivolously. R Vol. XL VII, pp. 5835-5837. Valiant failed to present any
other argument why these costs were uncommon or exceptional.
Besides failing to show these costs were exceptional, Valiant also failed to meet its burden
to establish that any of its other requested discretionary costs should in the interest of justice be
assessed against VP. Valiant never set fmth any reasons why justice would require VP be taxed
with an award of discretionary costs, other than its argument that VP acted frivolously. R Vol.
XLI, pp. 5052-55; R Vol. XLVII, p. 5767. As noted above, the district court disagreed with Valiant
that VP acted frivolously.
The trial court failed to determine a basis for finding any of the costs were exceptional. In
Easterling v. Kendall, 159 Idaho 901,367 P.3d 1214, 1229 (2015), this Court reiterated:

"[i]n Hoagland [v. Ada County, 154 Idaho 900, 303 P.3d 587 (2013)], this Court
set forth factors a district court should consider when determining whether costs
are exceptional: 'whether there was unnecessary duplication of work, whether there
was an unnecessary waste oftime, the frivolity of issues presented, and creation of
unnecessary cost that could have been easily avoided. Most imp01tantly, however,
a comt should explain why the circumstances of a case render it exceptional.' Id.
(emphasis in original)."
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The district court did not act within the boundaries of its discretion when it awarded
discretionary costs to Valiant. Valiant made no showing under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(D) that the
discretionary costs it sought were exceptional and in the interest of justice should be assessed
against NIR.

More importantly, the distdct comt made no finding why it considered the

discretionary costs requested by Valiant to be exceptional costs.
Turning to the specific discretionary costs awarded by the district comt, it is apparent that
the costs, while perhaps necessary and reasonably incun-ed, are all common in a commercial
foreclosure action. Addressing the litigation guarantee first, there was no showing made, nor facts
to support a conclusion, that the cost of a litigation guarantee in this commercial foreclosure action
was uncommon. Recently in a special concun-ing opinion, Justice Jim Jones mentioned that
obtaining a litigation guarantee in aid of co~mercial foreclosure is common and an exercise of
due diligence:
ACI did due diligence by obtaining a litigation guaranty prior to commencing its
foreclosure action and naming as pmties those who were listed in the litigation
guaranty. The result here is harsh from ACrs standpoint but it may have some
recourse thl'Ough its litigation guaranty.
Sims v. ACI Northwest., Inc., 157 Idaho 906, 342 P.3d 618, 627 (2015) (J. Jones, J., concuning).

Indeed, in a related case this Court encouraged the use of a litigation guarantee to ensure proper
parties are named in a foreclosure action: "Fmther, Sims1s confusion could have been cleared up
had he taken the simple step of obtaining a title report or litigation guaranty from a title company."
Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980,342 P.3d 907, 914 (2015). The Appellant submits to this Court

that litigation guarantees are commonplace in all types of foreclosm·e actions, including mortgage
foreclosure actions, and especially when the commercial mortgages encumber multiple parcels of
real prope1ty.
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Each of the other discretionary costs awarded by the district court suffers from the same
flaw: none are supported by findings that the costs were uncommon in a commercial mortgage
foreclosure action. Indeed, each of the "discretionary costs" awarded by the district comt can be
described as "routine costs associated with modem litigation overhead," rather than exceptional
costs. See City ofMcCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 589, 130 P.3d 1118, 1127 (2006) (trial court
did not abuse discretion in denying claim for discretionary costs when costs were routine).
The district comt never made a finding that the costs of travel for Valiant's counsel was
uncommon or exceptional, only that the travel costs were necessary and significant. R Vol.
XL VIII, p. 5840. As Justice Silak stated almost two decades ago, costs for travel are "ordinary
and mundane" and not exceptional. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 ldaho at 88, 983 P.2d at 842 (Silak,
J. & Trout, CJ .. , dissenting).
Each of the remaining discretionary costs awarded by the district cmnt are also "routine
costs associated with modern litigation overhead" and so "ordinary and mundane" that they should
not qualify as exceptional or unconm1on costs. All litigation includes expenses for copying and
scanning pleadings, correspondence, and other case related documents. Every litigation includes
costs of propounding and processing discovery. Every litigation includes costs for postage and
courier services. Every litigation involves costs for telephone calls and conferences. Litigation
with trial witnesses almost always includes costs of witnesses exceeding the meager $20 allowable
as a matter of right. While the district court in some instances found that the costs Valiant incurred
were necessary, it failed to make any findings that the costs were uncommon for this type of
litigation. R Vol. XLVIII, pp. 5840-41.
Also, the district comt's appo1tionment of the discretionary costs lacked rhyme or reason.
Rather than addressing what parties in the interest of justice should be taxed with discretionary
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costs, the district court awarded those costs against NIR, VP, and N according to a rntio that it
created with no explanation. R Vol. XLVIII p. 5 841.
The ratio appears to account for the fact that NIR was dismissed at summary judgment and
participated in the case less than VP and JV, who, according to the ratios given, had an equal
involvement in the case. Id. No costs were apportioned against the defaulting party, POBD. The
lack of explanation for how these ratios were derived and the lack of equating these ratios to
specific acts of the patties and any correlation to any of the specific discretionary costs awarded
evidences that this "app01tionment" was not created by an exercise of reason and does not satisfy
the interests of justice. There is no reason or justice in taxing VP's assigned percentage of the cost
of a litigation guarantee that was obtained before VP had even appeared in the case. If VP had
simply allowed Valiant to talce a default judgment against it in this case, that cost would not have
been avoided. There is no reason or justice to tax VP a percentage of the travel costs of Valiant,
when Valiant chose to engage attorneys in Boise rather than attorneys closer to the subject property
and venue of the action. There is no reason or justice in taxing VP a percentage of the ordinary
and mundane litigation costs incurred by Valiant in this case.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing argument, the summary judgment against VP on its easement
rights and equitable servitudes should be reversed and remanded. The discretionary costs awarded
against VP should be vacated. The injunction allowing Valiant to collect sewer service fees under
VP' s customer service contracts should be vacated. The injunction requiring VP to provide Valiant
water services absent a customer service agreement should be vacated.
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